Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mission packages determining  the best mix by Abbott, Benjamin P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mission
packages determining  the best mix
Abbott, Benjamin P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4291










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) MISSION PACKAGES: 








 Thesis Advisor: Thomas W. Lucas 
 Co-Advisor: Jeffery Kline 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Packages:  
Determining the Best Mix 
6. AUTHOR(S) Abbott, Benjamin P. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 
PMS 420, Washington Naval Yard, Washington D.C.  
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The threat of a large fleet engagement in the open ocean is currently over shadowed by the asymmetric challenges 
presented by state and non-state actors using the littorals for illicit purposes.  Unlike traditional multi-mission 
combatants, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a focused mission platform significantly less capable of handling 
simultaneous missions, whether they are planned or not.  However, when deploying LCS as a squadron, a 
Combatant Commander may select to equip multiple LCS platforms with a mix of focused mission packages to 
ensure operational success across the broad range of challenges associated with littoral warfare.  Through the use 
of simulation, design of experiments, and data analysis, this thesis simulated 41,195 littoral operations to address 
how many LCS should comprise an employed squadron, what the composition of a squadron should be, and how 
sensors and weapon systems contribute to the effectiveness of an employed squadron.  The results indicate that a 
squadron size of six to ten LCS produces the best results, and that a compositional rule of thumb of five LCS for 
the primary threat and two LCS for the secondary threat applies to each warfare area.  Lastly, the number of 
casualties suffered in each warfare area reinforces the danger associated with littoral combat and serves as a 
reminder that close engagement, while necessary, carries a cost. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
135 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Mission Packages, Unmanned Vehicles, 
Remotely Manned Vehicles, Data Farming, Agent-based Models, MANA, Simulation Experiments 
and Efficient Designs Center, Surface Warfare, Quantitative Analysis 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) MISSION PACKAGES:  DETERMINING 
THE BEST MIX 
 
Benjamin P. Abbott 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Benjamin P. Abbott 
 
 




  Jeff Kline 
  Thesis Co-Advisor 
 
   




James N. Eagle 





























The threat of a large fleet engagement in the open ocean is currently over 
shadowed by the asymmetric challenges presented by state and non-state actors using the 
littorals for illicit purposes.  Unlike traditional multi-mission combatants, the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) is a focused mission platform significantly less capable of handling 
simultaneous missions, whether they are planned or not.  However, when deploying LCS 
as a squadron, a Combatant Commander may select to equip multiple LCS platforms with 
a mix of focused mission packages to ensure operational success across the broad range 
of challenges associated with littoral warfare.  Through the use of simulation, design of 
experiments, and data analysis, this thesis simulated 41,195 littoral operations to address 
how many LCS should comprise an employed squadron, what the composition of a 
squadron should be, and how sensors and weapon systems contribute to the effectiveness 
of an employed squadron.  The results indicate that a squadron size of six to ten LCS 
produces the best results, and that a compositional rule of thumb of five LCS for the 
primary threat and two LCS for the secondary threat applies to each warfare area.  Lastly, 
the number of casualties suffered in each warfare area reinforces the danger associated 
with littoral combat and serves as a reminder that close engagement, while necessary, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis addresses the size, composition and effects of sensors and weapon 
systems of an employed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron in littoral combat.  This 
summary gives an overview of LCS, describes the methodology of the research, and 
provides the resulting conclusions and recommendations.  The goal of this research is to 
provide analytic support for the effective use of an employed LCS squadron.  
LCS is a highly capable platform that promises to lead the Navy into the 21st 
century by providing access to the littorals, releasing multi-mission surface combatants 
for more appropriate tasking, and leveraging the technology of unmanned vehicles.  The 
flexibility inherent in LCS allows it to operate independently, as part of an employed 
squadron, or as part of a Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group (CSG/ESG).  The ship’s 
heavy reliance on technology and bold approach to manning has driven numerous studies 
to determine procedures, develop operational concepts, and identify best practices for 
LCS.  Across all studies the mission of LCS remains constant; it must be able to ensure 
joint force access to the littorals.  Unlike traditional multi-mission combatants, LCS is a 
focused mission platform significantly less capable of handling simultaneous missions, 
whether they are planned or not.  However, when deploying LCS as part of a squadron, a 
Combatant Commander may select to equip multiple LCS platforms with a mix of 
focused mission packages to ensure operational success across the broad range of 
challenges associated with littoral warfare. 
This analysis is guided by three questions to provide insight into the capabilities 
of an employed LCS squadron in a stressing operational environment.  They are: 
• How many LCS should there be in a squadron? 
• What combination of mission packages is needed in the LCS squadron to 
complete the given focused mission when the possibility of multiple 
threats exists? 
• How effective are sensors and weapon systems with regards to enabling 
LCS to complete its focused mission? 
These questions are addressed using simulation, data farming techniques, and data 
analysis.  In addition to providing insight into these questions, this thesis provides a 
 xx
foundation for the use of simulation and data farming techniques for research on similar 
or related topics.  The primary motivation for this thesis is to provide analytic support to 
determine the best configuration of an employed LCS squadron in order to complete a 
mission conducted in waters complicated by a broad range of threats. 
In order to accurately address the questions driving this research, three robust 
scenarios were created based on the current mission packages for LCS:  Surface Warfare 
(SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine Warfare (MIW).  In each of these 
scenarios, an employed LCS squadron is deployed to neutralize a primary threat, but 
faces the possibility of a secondary threat in a different warfare area.  For example, in the 
SUW scenario an employed LCS squadron is given a mission to neutralize a missile boat 
threat, but a submarine threat may exist in the same waters.  An agent based combat 
modeling environment called Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) is used to 
implement these scenarios.  The figure below shows a snapshot of the SUW scenario at 
problem start.   
 
 
Red agents are 
enemies: submarines 
and missile boats 
Blue agents are SUW 
LCS and SUW MH-
60R.  Purple agents 
are ASW LCS, ASW 
MH-60R, and ASW 
USV. 
Green agents are 
merchant 
 xxi
This simulation model uses a technique called data farming, which produces large 
amounts of data points through the use of high performance computing.  This allows 
numerous variables (i.e., number of SUW LCS, number of missile boats, and 
probabilities of kill and detection for sensors and weapon systems) to be analyzed over 
broad ranges, providing insight into a large number of possible outcomes.  Through this 
technique 41,195 littoral combat operations were simulated, 23,130 of which were used 
to produce the research data.  These simulated operations were conducted in short order, 
and would have been costly and time consuming if conducted in real life. 
Analysis of the simulation results addresses the questions posed by this thesis, and 
provides additional insights as well.  With regards to the size of the employed LCS 
squadron, the analysis shows that a squadron size of six to ten LCS produces relatively 
low friendly casualties with high enemy casualties in all three warfare areas.  Addressing 
the question of the composition of the employed LCS squadron, the analysis shows the 
following: 
• Five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS produce low friendly casualties with 
high enemy casualties in the SUW scenario.  
• Five ASW LCS and one SUW LCS produce low friendly casualties with 
high enemy casualties in the ASW scenario. 
• Six MIW LCS and one SUW LCS produce low friendly casualties and 
high enemy casualties in the MIW scenario. 
• Five LCS configured for the primary threat and two LCS configured for 
the secondary threat serves as a compositional rule of thumb 
With regards to the effects of sensors and weapon systems, the analysis shows the 
following: 
• Number of LCS is more significant than sensors and weapon systems in 
the SUW scenario. 
• Hellfire Probability of Kill (Pk), Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Pk, 
SUW MH-60R Probability of Detection (Pd), ASW Unmanned Surface 
Vehicle (USV) Pd, and Blue Torpedo Pd are identified as playing a 
significant role in the ASW scenario. 
• 57mm Pk is identified as playing a significant role in the MIW scenario 
due to it being the predominant SUW weapon on a MIW LCS. 
 xxii
While unable to provide precise thresholds for most of the sensors and weapon 
systems identified as significant, this thesis shows that certain systems play a significant 
role in the mission effectiveness of an employed LCS squadron. 
Combining the results and insights produced by this thesis, the following 
recommendations are made: 
• In order to produce low mean Blue casualties and high mean Red 
casualties, it is recommended the employed LCS squadron consist of six to 
ten LCS. 
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an SUW mission that 
may contain a submarine threat, it is recommended that a composition of 
at least five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS be implemented.  
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an ASW mission that 
may include a surface threat, it is recommended that a composition of at 
least five ASW LCS and one SUW LCS be implemented.  
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an MIW mission that 
may include a surface threat, it is recommended that a composition of six 
MIW LCS and at least one SUW LCS be implemented.  
• When considering the use of an employed LCS squadron for an ASW 
mission, it is recommended that additional fleet assets be provided to 
support the squadron if the expected number of enemy submarines is ten 
or more. 
• When considering the use of an employed LCS squadron for a SUW 
mission that may contain a submarine threat, it is recommended that the 
squadron pursue the SUW threat using tactics that allow for the 
maximized use of ASW sensors and weapon systems. 
• Due to the inherent risk of littoral combat, it is recommended that a 
paradigm shift occur in the U. S. Navy such that both ship and personnel 
casualties are expected and accepted.  
• The use of simulation and data farming helped provide valuable insight in 
short order for an asset that is not yet deployable.  It is recommended that 
simulation and data farming techniques be used in future U. S. Navy 
research to guide the development and deployment of new technologies. 
This thesis provides analytic support for the size and composition of an employed 
LCS squadron based on a region and threat set, and identifies significant sensors and 
weapon systems for each warfare area.  The result is sound analysis that can be used to 
assist the Navy in the continued development of policies, Concepts of Operation 
(CONOPS), and tactics for LCS and its mission packages. 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We cannot sit out in the deep blue, waiting for the enemy to come to us.  
He will not.  We must go to him.  I want the ability to go close in and stay 
there.* 
ADM Mike Mullen, USN 
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the end of the Cold War, the threat facing the United States Navy has 
changed dramatically.  Gone are the days where American naval operations were focused 
on defeating the growing Soviet challenge in blue water.  Today, this challenge has been 
replaced by states that employ patrol boats, capable and quiet diesel submarines, sea 
mines, land-based anti-ship cruise missiles and other irregular means to deny access to 
U.S. forces attempting to influence events ashore.  The threat of a large fleet engagement 
in the open ocean is currently overshadowed by the asymmetric challenges presented by 
state and non-state actors using the littorals for illicit purposes.  Concurrently, industry 
has developed technologies that enable remotely controlled systems to operate over, on 
and below the water.  The Navy realizes the operational potential of these systems and is 
working toward incorporating them into the fleet.  This strategic transition and 
technological sea change have caused the Navy to revisit a force structure built on the 
premise of fleet engagement.  Navy leadership determined that a ship able to operate in 
the littorals and take advantage of unmanned vehicles is a key component in maintaining 
an operational advantage at sea.  The result is a frigate sized, modular, focused-mission 
platform called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
With a smaller crew and a building cost less than current surface combatants, LCS 
provides the Navy an agile, adaptable platform that provides the near shore capability 
described by Admiral Mullen in his remarks at the Naval War College in August 2005.  
Its modular, focused-mission capability in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Surface 
Warfare (SUW), and Mine Warfare (MIW) allows the Combatant Commander to tailor 
                                                 
* Quote taken from “To Students and Faculty of the Naval War College,” a speech given by Adm. 
Mike Mullen at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. on 31 August 2005. 
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each LCS or LCS squadron to meet operational requirements.  The Navy is still 
developing systems, procedures, and tactics for LCS and its unmanned vehicles using a 
process that requires frequent review to ensure operational suitability.  In order to answer 
the demand signal for LCS, the Navy implemented a strategy of evolutionary acquisition 
with modular systems that may be adapted through spiral development to respond to 
evolving operational requirements.  Implementing a modular open-architecture design 
enables capability insertion with greater agility, responding to fleet needs and 
opportunities stemming from maturing new technologies.  This revolutionary process 
saves the Navy years in the acquisition process, but requires constant analysis to ensure 
continuity between what is required and what is developed. 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
LCS is a highly capable platform that promises to lead the Navy into the 21st 
century by providing access to the littorals, releasing multi-mission surface combatants 
for more appropriate tasking, and leveraging the technology of unmanned vehicles.  The 
flexibility inherent in LCS allows it to operate independently, as part of an employed 
squadron, or as part of a Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group (CSG/ESG).  The ship’s 
heavy reliance on technology and bold approach to manning has driven numerous studies 
to determine procedures, develop operational concepts, and identify best practices for 
LCS.  Across all studies the mission of LCS remains constant; it must be able to ensure 
joint force access to the littorals.  The primary motivation for this thesis is to provide 
analytic support for determination of the best configuration of an LCS squadron in order 
to complete a mission conducted in waters complicated by a broad range of threats. 
Due to fundamental differences in manning concepts and platform configuration, 
a study of LCS must be approached differently than one examining legacy combatants.  
The policies, strategies, and tactics used to direct employment of traditional multi-
mission platforms do not necessarily apply to LCS.  These differences, coupled with a 
general misunderstanding of the LCS concept, have resulted in questions regarding the 
capability and operational utility of LCS.  With the vision that LCS would require a shift 
in operational paradigm within the Navy, Commander Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) 
 3 
issued a set of “cardinal rules” that are to be applied to LCS.  These rules specifically 
state that multi-mission capability for LCS should not be sought, and that LCS cannot be 
compared to legacy platforms. (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2007)  While these 
statements highlight significant differences between LCS and current fleet surface 
combatants, both share the task of operating in dangerous and unpredictable 
environments.  Unlike traditional multi-mission combatants, LCS is a focused mission 
platform significantly less capable of handling simultaneous missions, whether they are 
planned or not.  However, when deploying LCS as part of a squadron, a Combatant 
Commander may select to equip multiple LCS platforms with a mix of focused mission 
packages to ensure operational success across the broad range of challenges associated 
with littoral warfare. 
The ability of LCS to establish littoral dominance does not benefit the Navy 
alone, especially as the military becomes an increasingly joint organization.  The 
importance of littoral warfare to the joint force was understood by the military as early as 
World War II, and was used extensively in the Pacific Theater to secure islands such as 
Guadalcanal. (Dunnigan and Nofi, 1995)  This importance has been re-emphasized by 
stating: 
Maintaining battlespace dominance will remain essential to the Joint 
Forces Commander (JFC) if forces ashore are to maintain their freedom of 
action.  This means that battlespace control over a substantial littoral area 
must be secure and maintained long enough to successfully project combat 
power ashore to achieve the JFC’s objectives. (Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council, 2004)  
This statement suggests that accessing the littorals alone is not sufficient, as this would 
only provide the joint force with temporary security and operational freedom.    This tenet 
also applies to LCS operations in support of larger strike groups.  To be a reliable asset to 
the Navy, an LCS squadron must be able to perform various missions in the littorals in 
the face of a multi-dimensional threat.  Figure 1 illustrates how LCS will be used to gain 
and maintain access to the littorals.  While much analysis has been done on the ability of 
LCS to perform certain individual missions, its efficiency in executing those missions in 
an environment that may contain more than one threat requires further exploration.     
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Figure 1.   Pictorial display of the concept of LCS operations (from Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council, 2004) 
 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze LCS mission capabilities in an environment 
that presents a broad range of threats—both traditional in nature and those driven by 
irregular tactics.  While this analysis cannot account for all possible scenarios or 
environments, the following questions guide this research: 
 
• How many LCS should there be in a squadron? 
• What combination of mission packages is needed in the LCS squadron to 
complete the given focused mission when the possibility of multiple 
threats exists? 
• How effective are sensors and weapon systems with regards to enabling 
LCS to complete its focused mission? 
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This thesis uses simulation, data analysis, and other analytical methods to 
investigate these questions and develops a methodology to determine the best 
configuration of a LCS squadron.  This is done for a given region based on the threats 
that may exist. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis provides the U.S. Navy analytical support for the continued 
development of policies, concepts of operations (CONOPS), and tactics for LCS and its 
mission packages.  Additionally, this study provides insight into the capabilities of both 
an individual LCS and an LCS squadron when operating in an environment that presents 
a wide range of operational challenges.  Ultimately, this thesis provides the Navy a 
methodology to determine the best configuration of an LCS squadron to successfully 
support joint force operations in an environment rife with asymmetric or irregular 
challenges. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Using several analytic techniques, this thesis develops a means by which the 
Navy can evaluate operational configurations of an LCS squadron engaged in a variety of 
mission areas.  Quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for all three mission areas 
are identified and used to determine size and composition of an employed squadron. 
(Morris, 2000)  Design of experiments techniques are used to vary the probabilities of 
detection, and kill for each sensor and weapon system in the mission packages.  In order 
to evaluate its performance in a stressing operational environment, an agent-based 
computer simulation is used to place LCS in numerous scenarios that contain multiple 
threats.  
This thesis uses an agent-based distillation—a type of computer simulation that 
attempts to model only the salient features of a situation and not every possible 
characteristic. (Cioppa, Lucas, and Sanchez, 2004)  The tool used is Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata (MANA), a product developed by New Zealand’s Defense 
Technology Agency (DTA).  The methodology is to develop scenarios that present a 
range of threats for each mission area.  These scenarios are then replicated in the 
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simulation tool and the performance of LCS is analyzed.  Exploratory analysis, or data 
farming, then identifies previously undetermined characteristics and situations that 
develop during the simulations. (Cioppa, Lucas, Sanchez, 2004)  Statistical analysis and 
other analytic techniques identify and determine the importance of interactions between 
variables and lead to understanding the significance of the data.  The results of the 
statistical analysis help identify the best configuration of an LCS squadron for each 
scenario.  Through quantitative analysis, this study enhances understanding as to how to 

































II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to accurately capture how LCS will perform in a stressing operational 
environment, robust scenarios that contain both the primary threat associated with each 
mission package and a realistic secondary threat are required.  In this chapter, a brief 
introduction of LCS will be given as well as descriptions of the scenarios used for this 
thesis.  After covering the scenarios, a brief description of the MANA simulation tool 
used to model LCS is provided.  Lastly, this chapter describes in detail how the 
simulation model behaves.  
B.  WHAT IS THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP? 
1. Overview  
Chapter one gives a brief description of LCS, however, a detailed look is required 
to fully realize its potential.  Flexibility is the defining characteristic of LCS—the ability 
to operate in the littoral areas as part of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG), multi-national force, or individually while bringing to bear 
capabilities needed for a specific mission.  The objective of the LCS concept of 
operations is to allow the U.S. Navy to reduce the number of sailors in closely contested 
areas and maximize asset allocation for the rest of the surface force.  The source of this 
flexibility resides in the seaframe concept: 
The attribute that differentiates the LCS from previous surface combatants 
is its role as a “seaframe”, serving much the same purposed as a 
reconfigurable airplane or helicopter airframe.  It incorporates open 
architecture mission packages that connect to core support systems and 
can be changed or modified in a short period of time. (Commander Naval 
Surface Forces, 2007) 
The seaframe is augmented by mission packages that are focused in one of three 
mission areas:  Surface Warfare (SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), or Mine 
Warfare (MIW).  Each mission package contains mission modules that are comprised of 
different mission systems, illustrated by Figure 2.  Due to the evolutionary nature of LCS 
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procurement, a snapshot of the seaframe and mission packages is required to perform this 
analysis.  The snapshot chosen for this work is the Warfighting Concept of Operations 
Revision Alpha, dated 14 March 2007.  This section provides a detailed look into the 
seaframe as well as the primary mission packages being developed for LCS.  
 
Figure 2.   Composition of a mission package (from PMS 420, 2008) 
 
2. Seaframe 
As the core of LCS, the seaframe provides basic self defense capability through 
organic sensors, weapons, and speed.  While two seaframe designs are still being 
considered, both are capable of attaining speeds over 40 knots and are similarly equipped 
regarding organic weaponry.  There are differences between the competing seaframes, 
but they are not the focus of this work.  Instead, the focus is on the weapons and systems 
of LCS and its mission packages.  While the two seaframes use different point defense 
missile systems, the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1 air defense missile system 
is being modeled in this thesis based solely on the number of missiles provided.  Figure 3 
shows the sensors and weapons used for the seaframe in this thesis.  
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Figure 3.   Sensors and weapons for the LCS Seaframe (from Naval Warfare 
Development Command, 2007) 
 
3.  Mission Packages 
The mission packages form the bulk of the warfighting capability of LCS.  Three 
warfare areas have been identified as immediately necessary: SUW, ASW, and MIW.  
The possibility of additional mission package types is being considered by the navy, but 
the focus of this thesis is on the initial mission packages. 
a.   Surface Warfare (SUW) 
Designed to detect and engage multiple targets in the littorals, the SUW 
mission package strengthens the core seaframe capability by adding a helicopter armed 
with Hellfire missiles, two 30 millimeter guns, and the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) 
missile system. (Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2004)  While the MH-60S is 
listed as a possible part of the SUW mission package, this thesis models the MH-60R.  
The SUW mission package combined with the speed of LCS provides the Navy a 
credible asset to use against surface threats in the littorals.  Figure 4 shows the systems 
and weapons contained in the SUW mission package. 
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Figure 4.   Systems and weapons contained in the SUW mission package (from Naval 
Warfare Development Command, 2007) 
 
b.   Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
The ASW mission package takes advantage of off board technology in the 
search, localization, and prosecution of enemy submarines.  With the inclusion of 
unmanned vehicles, the ASW configured LCS is capable of sweeping and maintaining 
barriers or operating areas while reducing the risk of casualties.  Both the unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs) and the remote minehunting vehicles (RMVs)—configured for 
ASW—employ either towed array or dipping sonar payloads.  The USVs employ a 
dipping sonar similar to that used by the MH-60R Helicopter also included in the ASW 
mission package.  The tactic used by a dipping sonar, known as sprint and drift, is not 
easily modeled in MANA.  As such, an average search rate was determined for both the 
MH-60R and the USVs in order to model the effects of the sprint and drift tactic.  The 
RMVs operate differently from the USVs in that the former must operate as a pair.  With 
one RMV towing an active source and the second towing a passive towed array, the pair 
provides a bistatic sonar capability. (Naval Warfare Development Command, 2007)  
Unlike the SUW LCS which can fire or launch several SUW weapons, the ASW LCS 
does not have an anti-submarine weapon that is capable of being delivered by the LCS.   
 
(Not a modular component) 
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Instead, the ASW LCS relies on the MH-60R deploying Mk 54 torpedoes in order to 
neutralize the enemy.  Figure 5 shows the weapons and systems contained in the ASW 
mission package. 
 
Figure 5.   Systems and weapons contained in the ASW mission package (from Naval 
Warfare Development Command, 2007) 
 
c.   Mine Warfare (MIW) 
The MIW mission package, recognized as the most needed due to the 
aging of the Navy’s current mine countermeasure force, also takes advantage of 
unmanned vehicle technology.  Similar to the ASW mission package, the MIW mission 
package is dependent on its MH-60S helicopter for neutralization of detected mines.  
While Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel may be available for mines not 
capable of being neutralized by the MIW LCS, they are not being considered in this 
thesis.  The USVs and Remote Minehunting Systems (RMS) in the MIW mission 
package all use towed bodies to counter mines, but the RMSs in the MIW mission 
package work independently.  The MH-60S has several different weapons to neutralize 
different types of mines, but it is only able to carry one system at a time.  This capability 
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is abstractly modeled in order to focus on the overall system effectiveness and not the 
performance of specific weapons.  Figure 6 shows the systems and weapons that are 
contained in the MIW mission package. 
 
Figure 6.   Systems and weapons contained in the MIW mission package (from Naval 
Warfare Development Command, 2007) 
 
4.   Additional Capabilities 
While three mission packages have been identified as immediately necessary, 
other capabilities currently exist and additional needs may present themselves in the 
future.  For example, LCS has inherent Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
capabilities and the possibility of a special forces capable mission package is being 
considered.  (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2007)  The creation of additional 
mission packages is not limited to special forces, but is being considered for a broad 
range of operations.  The modular flexibility of LCS allows for additional mission 
packages as necessary, as well as creating variations to existing mission packages which 
may save cost or better meet operational needs.  This ability to create new mission 
packages to address a new threat instead of new platforms is one of the strengths of the 
LCS program. 
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C. DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS 
In order to gain insight into the necessary mix of a LCS squadron in an 
environment that may contain multiple threats, scenarios are developed for each of the 
three mission areas.  These scenarios contain the primary threat associated with each 
mission package and an additional threat that is associated with one of the other LCS 
mission packages.  This section explains the three different scenarios in detail. 
1.   SUW Scenario 
A CSG is preparing to transit a strait in a contested region.  A threatening nation 
disproves of the CSG’s presence in what it claims as its territorial waters, and is 
determined to take actions necessary to prevent the transit.  Intelligence reports suggest 
that the possibility of the CSG being attacked by missile boats is high, but the number of 
possible attackers is unknown.  Intelligence reports further stipulate that enemy 
submarines may be underway in the strait, and could support the missile boat attack.  The 
locations of the missile boat threat and possible submarine threat are unknown. 
a. Enemy 
Missile boats deployed in the strait have been ordered to attack any U.S. 
vessels detected.  Due to their individual vulnerability and cumulative strength, missile 
boats usually travel and attack as a group.  While submarines may or may not be 
underway in the strait, submarines that are in the strait have been ordered to patrol the 
entrance of the strait and to engage any U.S. vessel trying to gain entrance.    
b. Friendly 
The employed LCS squadron will vary in its size and allocation of mission 
packages.  If an ASW LCS is included in the squadron it will only use its MH-60R and 
USV for detection and prosecution of submarines due to the speed necessary for timely 
completion of the mission.  The squadron will transit the strait at 20 knots with its 




the ASW MH-60R as a both a scout and pouncer for enemy submarines if an ASW LCS 
is included in the squadron, and uses the SUW MH-60R as a scout for early detection of 
missile boats.   
c. Mission 
The mission of the employed LCS squadron is to clear the strait of any 
missile boat threats in order to provide a safe transit for the CSG, while minimizing the 
number of friendly casualties.  Any detected submarines will be considered as supporters 
of the missile boat threat, and viewed as targets of opportunity.  Figure 7 shows the SUW 
scenario at problem start. 
 
Figure 7.   Screen shot of SUW Scenario at problem start.  
 
2. ASW Scenario 
An ally of the U.S. has raised concern over the increase of naval activity by its 
neighbor in an adjacent strait.  This strait separates the ally from its neighbor, and the ally 
views the increase of activity as a sign of hostile intent.  As such, the ally has requested 
Green vessels 
are merchants 
Red agents are 
enemies: submarines 
and missile boats 
Blue agents are SUW LCS 
and SUW MH-60R.  
Purple agents are ASW 
LCS, ASW MH-60R, and 
ASW USV. 
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increased support from the U.S. both politically and militarily.  Political attempts have 
failed to de-escalate the situation, and a CSG has been deployed to the strait in order to 
protect both U.S. interests in the strait and its ally.  Intelligence reports that the increase 
in enemy naval activity has been primarily through the deployment of submarines, but 
that some missile boats may have been deployed as well.  An LCS squadron has been 
deployed to arrive in advance of the CSG. 
a. Enemy 
Submarines deployed in the strait have been ordered to patrol at slow 
speeds and to engage any contact deemed hostile regardless of nationality.  Each 
submarine is steaming independently in order to maximize the amount of water covered.  
Any missile boats that are deployed in the strait have been ordered to intercept surface 
vessels or aircraft deemed as hostile, with the act of searching for submarines included as 
a sign of hostile intent.  Due to their individual vulnerability and cumulative strength, 
missile boats transit and attack as a group. 
b. Friendly 
In order to clear the strait of enemy submarines, the employed LCS 
squadron transits with its USVs, RMVs, and helicopters deployed.  The squadron steams 
at 12 knots in order to provide the best search speed for its off board vehicles.  The size 
and composition of the LCS squadron will vary.  If a SUW LCS is included in the 
squadron its SUW MH-60R will serve as a scout, increasing the range of detection for 
any missile boats.  The ASW MH-60R will serve as a pouncer, prosecuting enemy 
submarines that are detected by the off board vehicles. 
c.  Mission  
The LCS squadron will clear the strait of enemy submarines while 
minimizing friendly casualties.  Any detected missile boats are considered hostile and 




Figure 8.   Screen shot of ASW Scenario at problem start.   
 
3. MIW Scenario 
Desiring to wreak havoc on the world’s economic system, a rogue nation has 
mined a strait that is a vital shipping lane.  The United Nations (UN) has agreed to 
economically sanction the rogue nation, but a coalition for military engagement could not 
be agreed upon.  Severely affected by the loss of the shipping lane, the U.S. has deployed 
an LCS squadron in order to regain shipping access to the strait.  Intelligence reports 
cannot confirm the number of mines used or their location, but do suggest that missile 
boats may be used by the rogue nation to counter mine clearance operations.       
a. Enemy 
Numerous mines have been deployed in a column across the width of the 
strait.  All missile boats deployed to the strait have been ordered to engage any vessel or 
aircraft that attempts to clear the mines or displays unusual behavior.  Due to their 
individual vulnerability and cumulative strength, missile boats transit and attack as a 
group.   
Blue agents are SUW LCS 
and SUW MH-60R.  Purple 
agents are ASW LCS, ASW 
MH-60R, ASW USV, and 
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Since the LCS squadron is not aware of the location of the mines, the 
USVs, RMSs, and helicopters will be deployed throughout the transit of the strait.  The 
squadron transits at 12 knots in order to employ the off board vehicles at their best search 
speed.  The size and composition of the LCS squadron varies.  The MIW MH-60S search 
for as well as neutralize detected mines, while the SUW MH-60R serves as a scout for 
any missile boats if an SUW LCS is assigned to the squadron.  The detection of mines by 
the helicopter or the off board vehicles is passed to all units in the squadron to prevent 
inadvertent entering of the mine field.  
c. Mission 
The LCS squadron desires to clear the strait of mines while minimizing 
friendly casualties.  Any detected missile boats are considered attempts to re-mine the 
strait, and will be engaged when detected.  Figure 9 shows the MIW scenario at problem 
start. 
 
Figure 9.   Screen shot of MIW scenario at problem start. 
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D. THE MANA COMBAT SIMULATION TOOL 
Having described the scenarios, this section discusses the combat simulation tool.  
An agent based distillation called Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) was 
selected as the model best suited for this work; this section explains how that decision 
was made. 
1. Choosing MANA 
This research started during an experience tour at Johns Hopkins University 
Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL).    While there, an agent based model called Sim Tool 
was introduced for possible use in this thesis.  Sim Tool was developed by JHU APL, and 
the fact that it already contained several agent personalities, sensors and weapon systems 
similar to that of LCS made its use attractive.  JHU APL was kind enough to release a 
copy of Sim Tool to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for use in this thesis, with the 
potential of further development of Sim Tool through troubleshooting.  As the research 
progressed it was discovered that alterations to the pre-programmed attributes in Sim 
Tool were necessary, which caused a problem regarding timing.  While working with the 
Sim Tool programmers on a few alterations, other agent based combat models were being 
considered in the event that the use of Sim Tool would become no longer viable. 
MANA is a combat model developed and given to NPS by New Zealand’s 
Defense Technology Agency (DTA); it is user friendly and well documented.  It is an 
excellent quick turn around tool—in MANA a generic scenario to model numerous 
outcomes can be quickly generated.  Agent personalities, sensors, weapons, and various 
other parameters are easily manipulated and, more importantly, MANA lends itself to 
data farming.  When the use of Sim Tool became too time consuming, these capabilities 
were major contributors in the decision to use MANA as the combat model for this thesis.   
2. MANA Characteristics 
Designed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency (DTA) to research 
complexity and chaos in combat, MANA is an agent based distillation that uses entities 
able to make their own decisions to explore the essence of a given problem (Galligan, 
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Anderson, and Lauren, 2004).  This independent decision making capability is achieved 
through the use of situation awareness maps, and establishing an agent’s personality—
how it responds to what it sees.  MANA’s bottom up approach facilitates modeling 
problems in a broad range of detail, depending on the needs of the user.  While MANA 
version 4.0 has been recently released, version 3.0.39 was used for this thesis due to the 
possibility of bugs in MANA 4.0.  The MANA User’s Manual provides much more 
information regarding MANA’s uses, characteristics, and capabilities.  Figure 10 shows 
the start up screen for MANA which provides reference information. 
 
Figure 10.   Screen Shot of MANA start up screen.  Website contains more reference 
material. 
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
The focus of this section is to provide the characteristics of the MANA model 
created for this research in terms that are easily understandable.  The goal of the 
simulation is discussed followed by the terrain and scale, the enemy forces, and friendly 
forces.  Finally, the issues of sources of data, abstractions, and assumptions are 
addressed.  A detailed breakdown of the personalities and capabilities of the enemy and 
friendly forces can be found in Appendix A.  
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1. Simulation Goal 
The scenarios used in this thesis are designed to stress each mission package in 
order to gain insight into the size and possible composition of an employed LCS 
squadron.  This being the case, LCS and its mission packages are abstractly modeled and 
the primary measure of effectiveness is not the number of enemy killed, but the number 
of friendly casualties.  The factors that play an important role in this simulation are the 
number of enemy platforms, the number and type of LCS, the probability of detection for 
the friendly sensors, and the probability of kill for friendly weapons.  Using design of 
experiment techniques, these factors are explored over large ranges to determine which 
factors are important and at what levels. 
2. Terrain and Scale 
MANA is a time step model that requires a coupling of simulation time and real 
time, as well as the simulation world and the real world.  In this simulation, each time 
step is equal to 30 seconds.  Each scenario lasts no longer than 5,000 time steps, which is 
slightly less than 48 hours.  The simulation map is 1,000 pixels by 1,000 pixels 
corresponding to a real world map of 335 nautical miles by 225 nautical miles.  This 
produces a pixel to nautical mile ratio of about 3:1, which provides for accurate modeling 
of agent movements.  This means that each pixel is approximately equivalent to 1/3 of a 
nautical mile.  If large pixels to nautical mile ratios are used, agents could move in 
unrealistic ways.  The above couplings results in a single run lasting anywhere from 7 to 
90 minutes on computers with processor speeds ranging from 448 MHz to 3.19 GHz.  
The source of variation in these run times is the number of agents involved in that given 
run. 
MANA provides the ability to model various types of terrain, including hilltops, 
light and dense brush, roads, and walls.  Since these scenarios are all nautical, terrain is 
not used with the exception of the wall and hilltop feature.  The wall feature is used to 
prevent ships and submarines from sailing on land, and the hilltop feature is used in the 
SUW scenario to prevent agents from detecting and engaging each other over a 
peninsula.  To achieve this, a terrain map is built by selecting the desired area map and 
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then using the MANA Scenario Map Editor to line the land in the map with the wall 
feature, and covering the peninsula with the hilltop feature.  This terrain map is used by 
the agents to assess situational awareness.  The different terrain features are assigned 
different colors in MANA; gray is the color for the wall feature and dark gray identifies 
the hilltop feature.  Figure 11 shows the terrain and background maps. 
 
Figure 11.   Terrain (left) and Background (right) maps used in the SUW scenario.  The 
gray lining the land on the terrain map is the wall feature and the dark gray 
covering the peninsula is the hill top feature. 
 
The terrain map is not the map seen by the user while conducting runs; what is 
seen is the background map.  This allows the user to show a recognizable real world map 
during simulations without affecting the agent’s simulation awareness.  Essentially, the 
terrain map is for the agents and the background map is for the user. 
3. Enemy Forces 
Each type of enemy is assigned a home position where they start the scenario.  
Submarines will independently patrol this position until they detect an enemy or take fire.  
Submarines will pursue a detected friendly agent and will evade if fired upon by 
increasing speed and taking random courses away from friendly forces.  These traits are 
also used by missile boats with minor variations.  While missile boats do not patrol, they 
transit and attack as a group for safety and cumulative strength.  When a friendly agent is 
detected the missile boats will pursue, and when taking fire the missile boats will try to 
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evade while pursuing and engaging the friendly agent.  Mines used in this simulation 
simply detonate whenever an agent comes within a specified range. 
4. Friendly Forces 
Like the enemy forces, friendly forces are assigned a home position as well as 
waypoints specific to each scenario.  Each variant of LCS transits from the home position 
through the waypoints engaging detected enemies when they are capable.  In the ASW 
and MIW scenario the waypoints are loosely followed to allow search of the entire strait.  
The helicopters associated with the mission packages transit along with the LCS 
according to their speeds, and will pursue and engage enemies detected.  Fuel 
consumption is modeled for the helicopters, with the SUW MH-60R needing to refuel 
every 3.5 hours, and the ASW MH-60R and MIW MH-60S requiring refueling every 3 
hours due to their search tactics.  During their refueling, which lasts 45 minutes, none of 
the helicopters can detect or engage enemies.  The off board vehicles behave similar to 
the helicopters, with the exception of engaging enemies and fuel.  None of the unmanned 
off board vehicles carry weapons, which limits them to pursuing the enemy and passing 
this detection to their respective LCS.  Since the SUW mission package adds two weapon 
systems to the LCS, the .50 caliber weapons are not modeled for the SUW LCS.  This is 
due to MANA’s limitation of four weapons per agent. 
5. Sources, Abstractions, and Assumptions 
With every simulation, the source of input data and assumptions are quite 
important.  In this simulation, communications and logistics are assumed to work 
perfectly.  This is to say that, regarding logistics, the location and number of available 
mission packages is not considered, and fuel (with the exception of helicopters) is 
unlimited.  Failure of equipment and maintenance are also not considered in this 
simulation.   
Enemy force sensor and weapon information, number of weapons per enemy 
agent, and capabilities of certain friendly sensors and weapons were taken from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 2006, All the World’s Aircraft 2006, and Underwater Warfare Systems 
2005.  The probabilities associated with enemy sensors and weapons were generalized 
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and reviewed by Dr. Tom Lucas, Ph.D., combat modeling expert at NPS, Jeff Kline, 
retired Navy Captain and Chair of Warfare Innovation at NPS, CAPT Mike Good, USN, 
Program Manager, LCS Mission Modules, and LCDR Bill Harrell, USN, Assistant 
Program Manager, MIW Mission Modules.   
Both the ASW MH-60R and the ASW USV use a dipping sonar to detect 
submarines; a tactic known as “sprint and drift.”  Since this tactic is not easily modeled in 
MANA, effective search rates were developed as an abstraction.  The search rates are 
based on 5 minutes lowering the sonar, 5 minutes operating the sonar, 5 minutes hoisting 
the sonar, and 5 minutes sprinting to the next search area.  The search rates result in an 
aggregate speed of 20 knots for the ASW MH-60R and 12 knots for the USV.  These 
search rates, as well as the refueling information for the helicopters were validated by 
Jeff Kline, and CDR Doug Burton, USN, Military Instructor at NPS and SH-60B pilot.  
The speed used for the MIW MH-60S was validated by LCDR Dale Johnson, USN, MH-
53 pilot and Operations Research student at NPS.  This model assumes that each LCS 
chooses to operate with its armed helicopter deployed.  This being the case, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) contained in the mission packages are not modeled.  
Characteristics and capabilities of LCS and its off board vehicles were provided by 
CAPT Mike Good and LCDR Bill Harrell.  The number of enemy and friendly agents, as 
well as the probabilities associated with the friendly sensors and weapons are explored 
through design of experiment techniques that will be discussed in the next chapter.  The 
ranges over which these parameters are explored were reviewed by Dr. Lucas, Captain 
Kline, and Colonel Ed Lesnowicz, retired Marine artillery officer with Wisdom Jacket 
Consulting. 
Very rarely does a simulation tool perfectly fit the problem being modeled.  
Frequently, modeling issues are discovered during the model development process and 
are either fixed through the developers of the tool or addressed through other modeling 
work arounds.  In this thesis, two such modeling issues were discovered.  The first 
modeling issue is the ability of the ASW LCS to detect submarines at the range of its 
surface search radar.  This occurs because, in MANA, the submarines are modeled as 
surface contacts and the non-ASW capable assets are programmed to ignore this specific 
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threat.  ASW capable assets, however, are programmed to engage any detected 
submarines.  In order to work around this modeling issue, ASW LCS were not allowed to 
pass submarine contacts to its ASW MH-60R and were given a stand off distance of 10 
nautical miles from detected submarines.  This prevented the ASW LCS from engaging 
submarines from unrealistic distances, and prevented the ASW LCS from driving into the 
torpedoes of an enemy submarine.  While this modeling issue does mean that an ASW 
LCS can detect an enemy submarine, it does not provide an unfair advantage due to the 
modeling work arounds mentioned, and the ASW LCS’ inability to deploy an ASW 
weapon.   
The second modeling issue occurs in the MIW scenario with the use of the NLOS 
missile against enemy mines.  Enemy mines are modeled similarly to enemy 
submarines— as surface contacts with non-MIW capable assets programmed to ignore 
the mines.  In order to prevent the non-MIW capable engaging the mines, the mines were 
made a non-targetable entity for each SUW weapon system.  When running the 
simulation it was discovered that, while the gunnery systems performed as programmed, 
the missile systems would occasionally engage the mines if other enemies were detected.  
In other words, the SUW LCS would not use NLOS to engage detected mines, but if it 
detected a missile boat and mines were also in range occasionally missiles would engage 
the mines.  After several attempts to trouble shoot the issues with the help of Lloyd 
Brown, Research Associate with the Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs 
(SEED) Center for Data Farming at NPS, the developers of MANA were informed of the 
issue.  The developers responded stating that a possible logic flaw in the MANA code 
relating to non-targetable classes has been discovered by the MIW scenario used in this 
thesis.  The developers are resolving the issue and will release updates for all MANA 
versions.  (McIntosh, 2008) While this modeling issue does mean that a few mines are 
engaged with missiles in the MIW scenario, the abstract modeling of the LCS squadron is 
not compromised due to its low rate of occurrence. 
During the model generation phase, the model was reviewed weekly by 
simulation experts and analysts to ensure the agent behaviors are adequately modeled.  
The model benefited from inputs from various engineers, military officers, analysts, and 
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simulation experts through the authors participation in an ASW LCS war game held at 
Naval Mine and Anti-submarine Warfare Command, San Diego, CA, sponsored by PMS 
420 and the 15th International Data Farming Workshop held in Singapore, sponsored by 
the SEED Center for Data Farming at NPS.  A preliminary set of runs and analysis of 
those results was presented to a panel of military officers, analysts, and combat 
simulators to ensure accuracy.  After conducting the preliminary analysis the simulations 
were run to generate the research data.  This process was used to produce accurate 
scenarios that would yield quality results.  
6. Summary 
In short, MANA is used to simulate scenarios that may be faced by a LCS 
squadron.  The scenarios cover the specific warfare areas, and are designed to stress the 
LCS squadron in order to provide insight into its size, composition, and the significance 
of the technologies involved.  The result is a simulation that captures the inherent dangers 
of operating on the sea and provides insight into how these dangers may be mitigated for 







































III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis implements a technique called data farming.  Simply stated, data 
farming uses a simple simulation model that is run numerous times while simultaneously 
changing the input parameters. (Bain, 2005)  The result is an output that covers a large 
number of possible outcomes.  This technique helps provide a better understanding of the 
system being analyzed and identifies regions that contain interesting events. (Cioppa, 
Lucas, and Sanchez, 2004)  To ensure that the simulation model is searched efficiently, 
an experimental design is necessary.  This chapter begins by discussing the variables used 
in this thesis, followed by an explanation of the designs used throughout the research.  
Lastly, the processes of running the experiment are discussed.   
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
There are two types of variables commonly used in simulation:  controllable and 
uncontrollable.  Controllable variables are those that can be altered by a decision maker 
in the real world.  Uncontrollable variables are those that a decision maker cannot 
control.  Controllable variables are referred to as decision factors, while uncontrollable 
variables are considered noise factors.  This thesis focuses on the decision factors in order 
to provide greater insight into a new platform.  As such, enemy sensor and weapon 
ranges, as well as their associated probabilities of detection and kill are fixed, making the 
number of enemies the only enemy variable.  Modeling details for each agent and their 
sensors and weapons is provided in Appendix A.  Figure 12 summarizes the variables 






Figure 12.   Variable factors used in the experimental design.  Decision factors are in 
yellow, and noise factors are in white. 
 
1. Controllable Factors 
The following variables are chosen in order to explore the effectiveness of the 
LCS squadron in stressing operational environments.  Since a fixed number of systems 
(i.e., helicopters, USVs, RMVs, and RMSs) come with each type of LCS mission 
package, only the number of LCS is varied.  
 
Factor Value Range Explanation 
SUW LCS 1…30 The number of SUW LCS in a given run 
ASW LCS 1…30 The number of ASW LCS in a given run 
MIW LCS 1…30 The number of MIW LCS in a given run 
SUW MH-60R Probability of 
Detection (PD) 0.5…1.0 
Probability of detection associated with the SUW MH-60R 
sensor 
ASW MH-60R Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the ASW MH-60R sensor 
MIW MH-60S 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the MIW MH-60S sensor 
ASW USV Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the ASW USV 
ASW RMV Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the ASW RMV 
MIW USV Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the MIW USV 
MIW RMS Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the MIW RMS 
LCS Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection associated with the LCS Seaframe 
NLOS Probability of Kill (Pk) 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the NLOS Missile System 
57mm Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the 57mm gun system 
30mm Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the 30mm gun system 
RAM Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the RAM point defense system 
.50 Caliber Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the .50 Caliber guns 
Blue Torpedo Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill associated with the torpedo used by the ASW MH-60R 
Hellfire Pk 0.5…1.0  Probability of kill associated with Hellfire missile system used by the SUW MH-60R 
Clearance Pk 0.5…1.0  Probability of kill associated with the mine clearance systems used by the MIW MH-60S 
Missile Boats 5…50 Number of missile boats used in a given run 
Submarines 5…30 Number of submarines used in a given run 
Mines 20…200 Number of agents in an enemy squad 
Merchants 0…5 Number of outbound, inbound and anchored merchants used in a given run 
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a. SUW LCS 
The number of SUW LCS in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For the 
SUW scenario this is varied from 1 to 30 due to the surface threat being primary.  In 
scenarios where the surface threat is secondary, the number of SUW LCS is varied from 
0 to 7. 
b. ASW LCS 
The number of ASW LCS in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For the 
ASW scenario this is varied from 1 to 30 due to the submarine threat being primary.  In 
the SUW scenario, the number of ASW LCS is varied from 0 to 5.  ASW LCS are 
modeled only in the SUW and ASW scenarios. 
c. MIW LCS 
The number of MIW LCS in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For the 
MIW scenario this is varied from 1 to 30 due to the mine threat being primary.  MIW 
LCS are modeled only in the MIW scenario. 
d. SUW MH-60R Probability of Detection (Pd) 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor for the SUW MH-
60R.  The sensor being modeled is the AN/APS-147 surface search radar.  This variable 
is modeled in all three scenarios.  
e. ASW MH-60R Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor for the ASW MH-
60R.  The sensor modeled is the AN/AQS-22 dipping sonar.  This variable is modeled 
only in the SUW and ASW scenarios. 
f. MIW MH-60S Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor for the MIW MH-
60S.  This probability abstractly models the possibility of using two systems for 
detection.  The MIW MH-60S can use either the AN/AQS-20A Mine Hunting System, or 
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the Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems (ALMDS), depending on the type of mine.  
This variable is modeled only in the MIW scenario.   
g. ASW USV Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the USV.  
This thesis models the use of the Unmanned Dipping Sonar (UDS), which operates 
similarly to the AN/AQS-22 of the ASW MH-60R.  This variable is modeled only in the 
ASW and SUW scenarios.  
h. ASW RMV Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the ASW 
RMV.  The ASW RMVs operate as a pair, with one using the Remote Towed Active 
Source (RTAS) and the other using the passive Remote Towed Array (RTA).  In this 
thesis, a single Pd is used for both sensors in each run.  This variable is modeled only in 
the ASW scenario.  
i. MIW USV Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the MIW 
USV.  The sensor modeled is the Mk 104 acoustic device, which is towed by the USV.  
This variable is modeled only in the MIW scenario. 
j. MIW RMS Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the MIW 
RMS.  The sensor being modeled is the AN/AQS-20A Mine Hunting System, which is 
towed by the RMS.  Unlike the ASW RMVs, the MIW RMSs operate independently.  
This variable is modeled only in the MIW scenario.   
k. LCS Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the LCS 
seaframe.  The sensor modeled is the 3D surface search radar that will be used by LCS.  
This variable is modeled in all three scenarios on all types of LCS. 
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l. NLOS Probability of Kill (Pk) 
The probability of kill associated with the NLOS missile system used in 
the SUW mission package.  This variable is modeled in all three scenarios. 
m. 57mm Pk  
The probability of kill associated with the 57mm gun system used by the 
LCS seaframe.  This variable is modeled in all three scenarios on all types of LCS. 
n. 30mm Pk  
The probability of kill associated with the 30mm gun systems used in the 
SUW mission package.  This variable is modeled in all three scenarios. 
o. RAM Pk  
The probability of kill associated with the RAM point defense system used 
by the LCS seaframe.  This variable is modeled in all three scenarios on all types of LCS. 
p. .50 Caliber Pk  
The probability of kill associated with the .50 Caliber crew served 
weapons used by the LCS seaframe.  This variable is modeled in all three scenarios but 
only on the ASW and MIW LCS. 
q. Blue Torpedo Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Mk 54 torpedo employed by the 
ASW MH-60R.  This variable is modeled only in the SUW and ASW scenarios. 
r. Hellfire Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Hellfire missile system that is 




s. Clearance Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the clearance capability of the MIW 
MH-60S.  This Pk abstractly models the various methods of mine clearance available to 
the MH-60S.  Three different systems may be used depending on the type of mine:  
Organic Airborne and Influence Sweep (OASIS), Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System (RAMICS), and Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS).   
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
The following uncontrollable variables were chosen in order to ensure the 
scenarios are realistically uncertain and to explore the capabilities of LCS over a range of 
conditions.  As mentioned earlier, these variables are factors that a decision maker is 
unable to affect and are seen as noise factors. 
a. Missile Boats 
The number of missile boats used in a given run.  The number of missile 
boats is varied from 5 to 50 in the SUW scenario due to their role as the primary threat.  
They are varied from 0 to 20 in the ASW scenario and from 0 to 15 in the MIW scenario, 
where they serve as a secondary threat.  The missile boats are modeled after the Chinese 
Fast Attack Craft – Missile (PGGF), and are modeled in all three scenarios. 
b. Submarines 
The number of submarines used in a given run.  The number of 
submarines is varied from 5 to 30 in the ASW scenario due to their role as the primary 
threat.  They are varied from 1 to 5 in the SUW scenario, where they serve as a secondary 
threat.  The submarines are an abstraction of various Kilo class submarines and are 
modeled only in the SUW and ASW scenarios. 
c. Mines 
The number of mines used in a given run.  These mines abstractly model 
the various types of mines that may be used. 
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d. Merchants 
The number of each type of merchant (outbound, inbound, and anchored) 
used for a given run.  The adding of merchants provides realism to the scenarios in that 
they add to the surface clutter for both friendly and enemy sensors.  Neither the enemy 
nor the LCS squadron is interested in engaging the merchants, but their presence makes 
detection and classification more difficult.  All three types of merchants (outbound, 
inbound, and anchored) are modeled in both the SUW and ASW scenarios.  As such, the 
number of merchants in each run times the three types of merchants will provide the total 
number of merchants for that run.  Since the MIW scenario only models outbound and 
inbound merchants, multiplying the number of merchants in each run times the two types 
of merchants modeled yields the total number of merchants for that run.  Merchants are 
used in the scenarios to provide surface clutter, making detection more difficult for both 
forces.  
C. THE EXPERIMENT 
Simulation modeling is an iterative process, which, when done correctly, ensures 
that the agents and their behaviors are modeled correctly.  For this thesis, three stages are 
used.  An initial exploratory design is implemented to gain familiarity with MANA and 
to debug any modeling issues.  Secondly, a preliminary design is created in order to 
ensure that scenario specific agents are being modeled correctly and to identify any last 
minute concerns.  Lastly, the full experiment is run to obtain the research data.   This 
section explains these three designs in detail, as well as the experimental design tool used 
to create them.  
1. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
The NOLH experimental design technique was developed at NPS by Lt. Col. 
Thomas Cioppa, United States Army, in 2002.  The technique was designed to efficiently 
explore simulations that have a large inputs space, requiring minimum a priori 
assumptions (Cioppa, 2002).  The orthogonality of the input variables provides the 
resulting data statistical properties that allow for efficient analysis.  The space filling 
property of the NOLH allows the analyst to explore more of the input space than the 
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traditional factorial design in which only high and low values are considered.  This is not 
to say that the use of a NOLH allows the analyst to see all of the input space, but, rather, 
a larger or more broad section of that input space.  A NOLH generation tool created by 
Professor Susan Sanchez at NPS is used to generate the designs for this thesis.  Detailed 
tables of the experimental designs used are provided in Appendix B.  Figure 13 shows the 
orthogonality and space filling properties of the NOLH through the use of a scatter plot 
matrix. 
 
Figure 13.   Scatter plot matrix of the variables in the SUW scenario illustrates the 
orthogonality and space filling properties of the NOLH.  Labels on the 
diagonal are the names of the variables. 
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2. Exploratory Design 
To explore MANA’s suitability to address LCS employment, an exploratory 
design of the SUW scenario was created.  This exploratory scenario is very abstract, 
includes only a primary threat, and is intended to provide insight into the modeling of the 
different personalities for each agent in the SUW scenario.  Four input variables are used:  
number of LCS, number of missile boats, LCS Pd, and NLOS Pk.  These four variables 
are varied through the NOLH creating 65 different input combinations.  Each of these 
combinations were replicated 100 times, resulting in 6,500 data points.  These data points 
are used to help further develop the simulation model. 
3. Preliminary Design 
Since the exploratory design is based only on an abstract SUW scenario, 
additional agents and capabilities are required in order to accurately model the other 
warfare environments.  The preliminary design was created to provide a more detailed 
look at each scenario after the refinement from the exploratory design.  An additional 12 
input variables were identified as necessary for the SUW scenario, and 13 variables were 
added to the ASW and MIW scenarios, resulting in 16 and 17 total input variables 
respectively.  The difference between the number of input variables is due to the use of 
RMVs and RMSs in the ASW and MIW scenarios.  In order to capture as much of the 
input space as possible, these variables are varied through the NOLH creating 257 
different situations for each scenario.  These runs were replicated 15 times each, resulting 
in 3,855 data points per scenario and 11,565 total data points.  These data points were 
analyzed and the results reviewed by simulation experts, analysts, and military officers to 
ensure that the scenarios were being modeled correctly before conducting the full 
experiment.  Some of the insights provided from these preliminary results include:  the 
addition of the ASW USV in the SUW scenario, and modeling helicopter fuel 
consumption.  
4. Full Design 
After refining the simulation model based on the inputs from the preliminary 
designs, the full design was implemented.  Since no additional input variables were 
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identified, the same 257 runs created by the NOLH for the preliminary design were used.  
Each of these runs was replicated 30 times each, resulting in 7,710 data points per 
scenario and 23,130 total data points.  These data points were used as the research data 
the analysis of which is the basis for this thesis and is covered in Chapter IV.   
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
MANA uses eXtensible Markup Language (XML) files to run simulations.  After 
identifying the input variables and creating the runs through the NOLH, an XML file had 
to be created for each run.  This was accomplished by writing executable programs in a 
scripting language called Ruby.  In short, these programs take the inputs from the NOLH 
and use them to generate 257 variations of the base XML file for each scenario.  The 
Ruby programs used to convert the inputs of the NOLH into the different XML files are 
provided in Appendix C.  Dave Thomas’ Programming Ruby: The Pragmatic 
Programmer’s Guide is an excellent source for detailed information on the Ruby 
programming language. 
The subsequent XML files were then placed on a cluster of computers operated 
by the Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center for Data Farming at 
NPS.  This cluster of high performance computers conducted the simulations for both the 
preliminary and full designs.  The preliminary designs took approximately 3 days per 
scenario to complete while the full designs averaged about 5 days per scenario.  These 
being the case, a total of 34,695 simulated battles were conducted over a period of 24 
days.  Adding the results of the exploratory design, which simulated 6,500 engagements 
in 10 hours on a personal laptop, this thesis created 41,195 littoral combat operations in 
approximately 25 days.  The large number of data points emphasizes the analytical 










IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The processes described in the previous chapter generated a large amount of data.  
This chapter begins by discussing how the data is collected and processed for analysis.  
The purpose of the analysis is to provide insight into the research questions, which are 
restated in this chapter.  Next, the insights gained are discussed for each scenario.  This 
chapter concludes by providing insights discovered in addition to the research questions. 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
The output provided by MANA is in the form of a comma-separated values 
(CSV) file that allows for simple processing.  This output file provides the number of 
injuries and casualties for each agent, as well as the total blue force and total red force 
using MANA’s numbering scheme to identify the different agents.  Additional 
information is provided in the output file (i.e., random seed, and run time) that do not 
contribute directly to the analysis.  Due to the large number of output files that required 
processing, Ruby programs were written to pull the relevant data from the individual 
output files, label the data appropriately, and combine each of the 257 output files into 
one large output file per scenario.  The Ruby programs used for the processing are 
provided in Appendix D.  The scenario output file contains the results of all 30 
replications of each run, resulting in 7,710 rows of data.  In order to compile the output 
data with the 257 rows of input variables, a summary of the scenario output file was 
needed.  This was accomplished by importing the scenario output file into a statistical 
software package called JMP version 7.0, and calculating the means of each input 
combination.  These 257 rows of mean values were then coupled with the input data to 
create the summary data set used for analysis.  The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) 
used in this research are mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties.  While 
mean total Blue casualties encompasses the entire friendly force including helicopters 
and unmanned vehicles, mean total LCS casualties considers only the number of LCS 
killed.   
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B. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In Chapter I, three questions were offered as the basis of this research.  Each of 
these questions is addressed through data analysis, and some additional insights have 
been discovered as well.  The research questions for this thesis are: 
 
• How many LCS should there be in an employed squadron? 
• What combination of mission packages is needed in the LCS squadron to 
complete the given focused mission when the possibility of multiple 
threats exists? 
• How effective are sensors and weapon systems with regards to enabling 
LCS to complete its focused mission? 
 
This analysis includes the use of several analytical tools, including regression 
trees.  Regression trees are exploratory models that help reveal structure in data.  
Regression trees are particularly useful in summarizing large data sets that contain many 
variables. (S-PLUS 7, 2005)  It is important to note that when viewing a regression tree, 
the lower values split to the left and higher values split to the right.  Appendix E provides 
a compilation of the graphs and regression results used in conducting this analysis. 
1. Size and Composition of the Employable LCS Squadron 
The questions regarding the size and composition of the LCS squadron are similar 
in nature, and, as such, are analyzed together.  This section addresses these both of these 
questions for each of the scenarios.  
a. SUW Scenario 
In order to gain understanding about the relationship between the variables 
and the MOEs, a regression model for each MOE was conducted using all of the input 
variables as predictors for the SUW scenario.  Figure 14 shows that SUW LCS, ASW 
LCS, Missile Boats, Submarines, and NLOS Pk are statistically significant, and explain 
82 percent of the variance in mean total Blue casualties.  These same variables are also 
statistically significant in predicting mean total LCS casualties, explaining 79 percent of 
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the variance in that MOE.  This analysis reveals that submarines and SUW LCS are the 
dominant factors in the SUW scenario.  Having established the significant factors for the 
two MOEs, regression tree analysis is used to determine possible thresholds. 
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Regression analysis not only illustrates percent of the variation explained 
and the significant factors, but identifies which factors have more influence and what 
their contribution to the MOE is.  In the case of Figure 14, number of SUW LCS and 
number of submarines are the most influential factors on mean total Blue casualties, 
which is quantified by their t-ratios—the larger the t-ratio the  more influential the factor.  
The estimate column of the regression analysis shows the contribution of each factor to 
the MOE.  For example, for each submarine added to the engagement, mean total Blue 
casualties will increase by 1.763.  Estimates with negative values will decrease the MOE. 
Regression tree analysis of mean total Blue casualties shows that the 
presence of submarines has a significant impact.  It also suggests that when there are less 
than three submarines, having less than ten SUW LCS produces lower mean total Blue 
casualties.  When considering situations where there are three or more submarines, less 
than five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS produces lower mean total Blue casualties.  
From this initial look, the limit of ten SUW LCS was considered an upper bound for the 
LCS squadron and the combination of less than five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS 
considered the lower bound.  This provides a range of six to ten LCS for the employable 
squadron.  Figures 15 and 16 show portions of the regression tree for mean total Blue 
casualties that illustrate the analysis for the lower and upper bounds of six and ten.  The 




















































































Figure 15.   Portion of regression tree of mean total Blue casualties where submarines 
are less than three   
 
As mentioned earlier, regression tree analysis conducts a binary split with 
the lower values displayed on the left hand side.  In each split the regression tree shows 
how many cases meet the specified criteria, the mean of the MOE for these cases, as well 
as the standard deviation.  Also included in the regression tree analysis is the significance 
of the split, captured by the log worth value.  For example, in Figure 15 the first split is 
on having less than three submarines.  There are 96 situations meeting this criteria, and 
for these 96 situations 7.10 is the average number of Blue casualties with a standard 
deviation of 2.58.  The log worth of this split is higher than the other splits showing its 
significance. 
Regression tree analysis of mean total LCS casualties produced similar 
results, supporting the squadron size of six to ten LCS (Appendix E).  Since both of these 
trees considered SUW LCS and ASW LCS separately, a new column of data was created 
labeled Total LCS; its values being the sum of the LCS used in each run.  Regression tree 
analysis of mean total LCS casualties when considering Total LCS shows that six to ten 
LCS produces lower mean total LCS casualties, including in situations where there are 
Less than 10 
SUW LCS are 
suggested to 
keep mean Blue 
casualties low 
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greater than three submarines.  Similar analysis of mean total Blue casualties suggests 
that having less than eight total LCS produces lower mean casualties in general, but that 
having eight or more total LCS produces lower mean casualties in situations where there 
are less than three submarines and less than 20 missile boats.  This suggest that a 
squadron of six to ten LCS is capable of producing lower mean total Blue casualties and 
mean total LCS casualties even in situations where there are up to three submarines and 
20 missile boats.  
 
Figure 16.   Portion of regression tree for mean total Blue casualties where there are 
three or more submarines   
 
In Figure 17, plotting mean total Blue casualties versus total LCS shows 
that mean total Blue casualties do increase over the range of six to ten, but at a slower 
rate.  In these charts, each dot represents the mean of 30 simulated littoral combat 
operations in which 17 different parameters have been varied.  The line connects the 
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for the corresponding number of total LCS.  These graphs are used to identify significant 
trends or knees in the curve.  Comparing this to the mean total Red casualties for the 
same range reveals that six to ten LCS produce up to 4.7 times more mean Red casualties 
than mean LCS casualties.  There is a noticeable plateau, however, in the mean total Blue 
casualties graph suggesting stable, non-increasing casualties over the 10 – 13 LCS range.  
When considering this plateau in the mean total Blue casualties in terms of mean total 
Red casualties, it was discovered that this range produces up to 3.5 times as many Red 
casualties.  This lower rate of mean Red casualties combined with higher, although 
stable, mean total Blue casualties further supports the effectiveness of a squadron 
comprised of six to ten LCS.   
Having addressed the size of the LCS squadron for the SUW scenario, 
consideration is given for the composition.  Previous regression tree analysis has 
consistently suggested that less than five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS produces lower 
mean casualties for both the Blue Force and LCS proper.  In order to capture how the Red 
forces fares in the situation, regression tree analysis of mean total Red casualties was 
conducted.  This analysis suggests that at least five SUW LCS should be included in the 
squadron, as this produces higher mean Red casualties.  With a size of six to ten LCS and 
a composition of at least five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS, an employable LCS 




Figure 17.   Graphs of Mean Total Blue Casualties, and Mean Total Red Casualties 
illustrating the impact of an employable LCS squadron containing six to ten 
LCS 
 
b. ASW Scenario 
Analysis of the ASW scenario was conducted in a similar fashion.  A 
linear regression was performed in order to provide understanding of the relationship 
between the MOEs and the variables.  Regression analysis reveals that ASW LCS, 
missile boats, and submarines are statistically significant in predicting mean total Blue 
casualties and that these parameters explain 78 percent of the variation in that MOE.  The 
analysis also shows that submarines, ASW LCS, and SUW LCS are the dominant factors 
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casualties for the ASW scenario.  The difference between the ASW scenario and the 
SUW scenario is the use of all the unmanned vehicles in the ASW mission package.  This 
increase in number of Blue forces increases the ASW LCS contribution to mean total 
Blue casualties.  When analyzing mean total LCS casualties, ASW LCS, SUW LCS, 
missile boats, submarines, and NLOS Pk are identified as statistically significant and 
explain 73 percent of the variance in that MOE.  While the number of SUW LCS does 
not seem to be significant in predicting mean total Blue casualties, it does contribute in 
determining mean total LCS casualties.   
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Having identified the significant factors among the ASW scenario data set, 
regression tree analysis was conducted.  The use of the Total LCS data column was also 
implemented for this data set.  Regression tree analysis of mean total Blue casualties 
shows that submarines are the most significant factor, a trait shared with the SUW 
scenario.  When there are 11 to 16 submarines, the regression tree suggests that less than 
11 total LCS produces lower mean Blue casualties, which supports the recommend upper 
bound of ten LCS per squadron.  The regression tree also suggests that five ASW LCS 
produce lower mean Blue casualties in situations where there are less than 11 submarines 
and when there are 16 or more submarines.  This disparity, suggesting the same number 
for both high and low numbers of enemies, suggests that there may be a limit to the 
number of submarines a squadron of LCS can handle.  Regression tree analysis of mean 
total LCS casualties further displays the disparity by suggesting 24 or more total LCS are 
needed to lower mean LCS casualties when there are less than 14 submarines, and that 
less than 8 total LCS are necessary to lower mean LCS casualties when there are 18 or 
more submarines.  This recommendation of either saturation or minimal involvement 
further emphasizes that there may be an upper bound for the amount of submarines an 
LCS squadron can handle.  Figure 19 shows a portion of the regression tree for mean 
total LCS casualties, which suggests that ten submarines may be the most an LCS 





































































































Figure 19.   Portion of regression tree for mean total LCS casualties for the ASW 
scenario 
  
Figure 20 illustrates the impact of an employed LCS squadron with six to 
ten LCS in the ASW scenario.  Mean total Blue casualties steadily increase over the 
range of six to ten LCS, due to the increase in the number of unmanned vehicles.  
Plotting mean total LCS casualties versus total LCS shows that the six to ten LCS range 
provides the knee in the curve.  While mean LCS casualties are increasing, they are 
increasing at a slower rate right before they spike.  Similarly, there is an increase in mean 
Red casualties over the six to ten LCS range.  This supports the previous analysis in the 
SUW scenario suggesting a squadron size of six to ten LCS.   
This split suggests that 10 
submarines may be the 
limit an LCS squadron can 
handle without support 
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Figure 20.   Graphs of mean total LCS casualties versus total LCS and mean total Red 
casualties versus total LCS  
 
In considering the squadron’s composition for the ASW scenario, previous 
regression tree analysis suggested five ASW LCS in order to provide lower mean Blue 
casualties.  Adding one SUW LCS increases mean total LCS casualties but produces an 
increase in mean Red casualties 1.5 times larger.  To determine the number of LCS that 
would cause the largest number of Red casualties, regression tree analysis of mean Red 
casualties was conducted.  The regression tree shows that seven or more ASW LCS 
produces higher mean Red casualties.  When one SUW LCS is added to the seven ASW 
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This suggests that while at least five ASW LCS and one SUW LCS is the recommended 
squadron composition to produce lower mean Blue casualties in the ASW scenario, seven 
ASW LCS and one SUW LCS provides the highest mean Red casualties. 
c. MIW Scenario 
The MIW scenario differs from the other scenarios in that it is the only 
scenario that does not include submarines.  While this may not be the only factor, it may 
contribute to the significantly lower LCS casualties seen in the MIW scenario; mean total 
LCS casualties do not exceed 0.1 throughout the range of simulations.  Similar to the 
ASW scenario, however, unmanned vehicles in the MIW scenario suffer larger casualties 
than the LCS.  This being the case, mean total Blue casualties plays a more significant 
role as a MOE in the MIW scenario.  Regression analysis of mean total Blue casualties 
identifies MIW LCS, SUW LCS, missile boats, mines, and clearance Pk as statistically 
significant, and shows that these parameters explain 78 percent of the variation in that 
MOE.  Similar analysis for mean total LCS casualties identifies MIW LCS, missile boats, 
mines, and 57mm Pk as statistically significant, but these parameters only explain 15 
percent of the variation for that MOE.  Again, this is due to the low mean LCS casualties 
seen in the MIW scenario.  Regression analysis also shows that mines, missile boats, and 
MIW LCS are the dominant factors.  Figure 21 shows the regression analysis of mean 
total Blue casualties for the MIW scenario. 
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Figure 21.   Regression analysis of mean total Blue casualties for the MIW scenario  
 
With both the SUW and ASW scenarios supporting a squadron of six to 
ten LCS, regression tree analysis was conducted to determine what thresholds would be 
discovered in the MIW scenario.  Similar to the other scenarios, the Total LCS column of 
data was used in this analysis.  The regression tree for mean total Blue casualties suggests 
that less than 12 MIW LCS produces lower mean Blue casualties.  It further suggests that 
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missile boats guarding the mine field.  This is significant since the regression tree also 
shows that the missile boats guarding the mine field have a greater impact on Blue 
casualties than the mines themselves.  Regression tree analysis of mean total LCS 
casualties suggests that mines do play a significant role in LCS casualties with less than 
182 mines producing lower mean LCS casualties.  In situations where there are less than 
182 mines, six or more MIW LCS produce lower mean LCS casualties, which are further 
lowered by adding one or more SUW LCS.  This supports previous analysis of a 
squadron size of six to ten LCS.  Figure 22 shows a portion of the regression tree of mean 























































































































Figure 22.   Portion of regression tree for mean total Blue casualties for the MIW 
scenario   
 
Plotting mean total Blue casualties versus total LCS shows that mean Blue 
casualties do increase in the six to ten LCS range, but also shows that use of more than 
ten LCS causes a significant and steady increase in mean Blue casualties.  Comparing 
Six or more MIW LCS 
produces lower mean total 
Blue casualties when there 
are up to eight missile 
boats 
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this to mean total Red casualties versus total LCS reveals a significant increase in mean 
Red casualties in the range of six to ten LCS range, with no increase in mean Red 
casualties when more than ten LCS are used.  These results further support a squadron 
size of six to ten LCS.  Figure 23 shows the impact of an employed squadron with six to 
ten LCS in the MIW scenario. 
 
Figure 23.   Graphs of mean total Red casualties versus total LCS and mean total Blue 
casualties versus total LCS 
 
Previous regression tree analysis suggests six MIW LCS and one SUW 
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casualties being low and the related analysis explaining little of the variance in mean total 
LCS casualties, analysis of mean Red casualties was conducted to help determine the 
squadron’s composition.  Regression analysis identifies MIW LCS, SUW LCS, missile 
boats, mines, and clearance Pk as statistically significant in predicting mean Red 
casualties, and shows that these parameters explain 92 percent of the variation in mean 
Red casualties.  More specifically, regression tree analysis suggests that using one or 
more SUW LCS produces higher mean Red casualties in situations when there are 96 to 
140 mines in the mine field.  If the enemy deploys 141 mines or more, however, using 
two or more SUW LCS would produce higher mean Red casualties.  This is due to using 
more missile boats to protect a larger minefield, and would not apply if only the number 
of mines were increased.  The analysis of the MIW scenario shows that a composition of 
at least six MIW LCS and one or more SUW LCS will produce low mean Blue casualties 
while inflicting high mean Red casualties. 
d. Summary 
In summary, all three scenarios provide analytic support for an employed 
LCS squadron that consists of six to ten LCS.  A composition of at least five SUW LCS 
and two ASW LCS is recommended for the SUW scenario, while at least five ASW LCS 
and one SUW LCS is recommended for the ASW scenario.  In the MIW scenario, at least 
six MIW LCS and one or more SUW LCS produced low mean Blue casualties and high 
mean Red casualties.    
2. Effects of Sensors and Weapon Systems 
The third question driving this research seeks insight into the contribution of 
sensors and weapon systems to the effectiveness of LCS.  Sensors and weapon systems 
are necessary in combat; the focus of this question, however, is how significant they are 
with respect to the MOEs.  This section discusses the significance of sensors and weapon 




a. SUW Scenario 
Analysis of the effect of sensors and weapon systems is conducted similar 
to that of determining the size and composition of the employable squadron.  The first 
step is to understand the relationship between the variables and the MOEs.  For sensors 
and weapon systems, the parameters used in the regression analysis are only the variables 
that are probabilities.  This is done in order to gain insight into the contribution of sensors 
and weapon systems alone.  In the SUW scenario, for example, regression analysis 
identified NLOS Pk as statistically significant in predicting both mean total Blue 
casualties and mean total LCS casualties when in the presence of SUW LCS, ASW LCS, 
missile boats, and submarines.  Regression analysis of both MOEs, when considering 
only sensors and weapon systems, does not identify any of them as statistically 
significant.  The fact that NLOS Pk is not statistically significant when only sensors and 
weapon systems were considered suggests that its contribution is reliant on one of the 
other parameters.  This is further supported by its lack of presence in the previous 
regression tree analysis when determining size and composition of the employable 
squadron.  Effects screening analysis was conducted for each MOE to determine when 
sensors and weapon systems do become statistically significant.  This analysis suggests 
that sensors and weapon systems become statistically significant only in the interaction 
terms.  This demonstrates the interdependence that can exist between sensors and the 
weapon systems that are used to neutralize targets they detect.   
A subset of the data was created where total LCS ranged from six to ten in 
order to determine if sensors and weapon systems become significant over this range.  
The analysis, however, produced the same results with the sensors and weapon systems 
becoming statistically significant only in the interaction terms.  The lack of statistical 
significance among any of the sensors or weapon systems in predicting the MOEs 
suggests that numbers of LCS has a greater impact than sensors and weapon systems in 
the SUW scenario.  Figure 24 shows the regression analysis of mean total Blue casualties 
and mean total LCS casualties when considering only sensors and weapon systems for 
the SUW scenario. 
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Figure 24.   Regression analysis of mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS 
casualties when considering only sensors and weapon systems for the SUW 
scenario 
 
b. ASW Scenario 
As with the SUW scenario, the previous analysis of the ASW scenario 
identified sensors and weapon systems as statistically significant in the presence of other 
parameters; LCS Pd in predicting mean total Blue casualties and blue torpedo Pk in 
predicting mean total Red casualties.  Neither of these systems is statistically significant, 
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against both the full data set and the subset of data where total LCS is from six to ten, 
none of the sensors or weapon systems are identified to be statistically significant in 
predicting the MOEs.  While effects screening analysis of the full data set reveals 
significance in only the interaction terms, effect screening of the data subset shows 
statistical significance among individual sensors and weapon systems.  When analyzing 
mean total Blue casualties, effects screening identifies Hellfire Pk, RAM Pk, SUW MH-
60R Pd, and other interaction terms as statistically significant, and that they explain 51 
percent of the variation in that MOE.  Similarly, effects screening analysis of mean total 
Red casualties identifies ASW USV Pd and other interaction terms as statistically 
significant and that they explain 54 percent of the variation in mean Red casualties.  
Regression tree analysis was used to determine possible thresholds, but was complicated 
by the interaction terms.  Previous regression tree analysis, however, suggests that a blue 
torpedo Pk of 79 percent or more produces higher mean Red casualties when there are 
seven or more ASW LCS in the squadron and 15 or more missile boats.  These results 
show that in a squadron size of six to ten LCS, Hellfire Pk, RAM Pk, SUW MH-60R Pd, 
and ASW USV Pd significantly contribute to the MOEs, and that a blue torpedo Pk of at 
least 79 percent produces high mean Red casualties in certain situations.  Figure 25 
shows the regression analysis resulting from the effects screening for mean total Blue 
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Figure 25.   Regression analysis resulting from effects screening of mean total Blue 
casualties in the ASW scenario when considering only sensors and weapon 
systems 
 
c. MIW Scenario 
Once again, previous regression analysis has identified certain sensors and 
weapon systems as statistically significant in the presence of other parameters; clearance 
Pk in predicting mean total Blue casualties and 57mm Pk in predicting mean total LCS 
casualties.  These two weapon systems, as well as the other sensors and weapon systems, 
fail to be identified as statistically significant, however, when only sensors and weapon 
systems are considered.  These results hold true for both the full data set and the subset of 
data where total LCS is from six to ten.  Effects screening analysis of the full data set 
Identifies Hellfire 
Pk, RAM Pk, and 




total Blue casualties 
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identifies 57mm Pk and other interaction terms as statistically significant in predicting 
mean total LCS casualties and shows that these parameters explain only 18 percent of the 
variation in the MOE.  Effects screening analysis of the six to ten total LCS subset shows 
statistical significance for sensors and weapon systems only in the interaction terms.  
While regression tree analysis was unable to identify thresholds for the sensors and 
weapon systems identified as statistically significant, these results show that 57mm Pk 
significantly contributes to mean total LCS casualties.  It is significant to note that the 
57mm is the predominant weapon on a MIW LCS for surface warfare.  Figure 26 shows 
the regression analysis resulting from effects screening of mean total LCS casualties 
when considering only at sensors and weapon systems for the MIW scenario. 
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Figure 26.   Regression analysis resulting from effects screening of mean total LCS 
casualties when considering only sensors and weapon systems for the MIW 
scenario 
d. Summary 
As the reliance on technology continues to rise, whether that technology is 
significant or useful will always be in question until it is employed in combat.  Such is 
the case with LCS and its sensors and weapon systems.  This section has shown that in 
each scenario sensors and weapon systems contribute in various levels to the MOEs.  In 
the SUW scenario, while NLOS Pk is significant in the presence of others, none of the 
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numbers of LCS play a larger role in impacting the MOEs.  Hellfire Pk, RAM Pk, SUW 
MH-60R Pd, and ASW USV Pd are statistically significant in the ASW scenario when 
using a squadron size of six to ten LCS, and a blue torpedo Pk of 79 percent or more 
produces higher mean Red casualties in certain situations.  The MIW scenario shows that 
57mm Pk is statistically significant in predicting mean total LCS casualties, with 
clearance Pk being significant in the presence of other parameters.  While the analysis is 
unable to provide thresholds for the sensors and weapon systems identified as statistically 
significant, the results show that certain sensors and weapon systems do contribute to the 
MOEs. 
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
In addition to addressing the research questions mentioned in Chapter I, further 
insights have been gained through this research. This section discusses these insights and 
impacts they may have on an employable LCS squadron. 
1. Significance of Submarines in the SUW Scenario 
When conducting the analysis for size and composition of the LCS squadron in 
the SUW scenario, it was discovered that submarines and not missile boats contributed 
the most to mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties.  These results 
suggest that the submarine threat be neutralized first in order to reduce casualties.  This 
introduces a reminder that the operating environment may not be perfectly known, that a 
threat more lethal than the one LCS is configured for may be present, and further 
supports the six to ten LCS squadron containing two ASW LCS for the SUW scenario.  
When conducting a SUW mission, if enemy submarines may be present this analysis 
shows that transiting at speeds ideal for the search and prosecution of the ASW threat 
results in lower Blue casualties.   
2. Limitations on the ASW Mission 
Previous regression tree analysis of the ASW scenario revealed a disparity 
suggesting saturation numbers of LCS in some situations and low numbers in others.  The 
regression tree analysis of mean total LCS casualties suggests that ten submarines may be 
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the most an employed LCS squadron may be able to handle without support.  Plotting 
mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties versus number of submarines 
shows that Blue casualties significantly increase in situations where there are more than 
ten submarines.  It also shows a steady, continuous rise in total LCS casualties for the 
same region.  This suggests additional support will be necessary for the LCS squadron in 
operating environments where there may be more than ten submarines.  Figure 27 shows 




Figure 27.     Graph showing the impact of more than ten submarines on mean total 
Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties  
 
3. Impact of Littoral Combat on the U. S. Navy Mindset 
With the advent of missile technology, the engagement of the enemy at sea has 
been extended.  The result of which being the U.S. Navy becoming comfortable with 
operating in uncontested waters and sending ordnance down range.  As such, reports of 
casualties caused at sea quickly become headlines particularly in the United States, which 
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The U.S. Navy’s bread-and-butter missions for thirty years, these 
“projection” operations have probably bred complacency about the nature 
of combat, which is not always so one-sided an affair. (Hughes, 1986) 
With mean total Blue casualties ranging from 2.99 to 17.38 and mean total LCS 
casualties ranging from 0.01 to 6.09, this thesis shows that engagement of the enemy in 
the littorals produces casualties.  Figure 28 shows the distributions of mean total Blue 
casualties for each warfare area when an employed LCS squadron of six to ten LCS is 
used.  This requires a change of mindset for the U. S. Navy such that casualties due to 
littoral combat are not only expected but are considered an acceptable cost for the given 
mission. 
 





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
With every new ship building program comes both questions and assumptions.  
For LCS, a platform that is designed to face the littoral threat in the post Cold War world, 
it is no different.  This research set out to provide analytic insight into the employment of 
LCS as a squadron in a stressing operational environment.  Through a simulation 
experiment based on realistic scenarios, this thesis produced detailed analysis regarding 
the size, composition, and effects of sensors and weapon systems of an employed LCS 
squadron.  The simulation work used for this thesis provides a solid base for future use of 
agent based models in exploring similar or related topics. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis was to address the following questions: 
 
• How many LCS should there be in a squadron? 
• What combination of mission packages is needed in the LCS squadron to 
complete the given focused mission when the possibility of multiple 
threats exists? 
• How effective are sensors and weapon systems with regards to enabling 
LCS to complete its focused mission? 
 
This section will briefly summarize the answers to these questions. 
1. Size of the Employed LCS Squadron 
The resulting data from the simulation experiment are analyzed through multiple 
regression and regression trees to provide insight into the size of the employed LCS 
squadron.  The analysis shows that a squadron size of six to ten LCS produces lower 
mean casualties for both the Blue force, and LCS specifically, while producing higher 
mean Red casualties in each of the warfare areas. 
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2. Composition of the Employed LCS Squadron 
Through the same analytical methods, the composition of the employed LCS 
squadron was considered.  The analysis shows that five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS 
are recommended for the SUW scenario; five ASW LCS and one SUW LCS are 
recommended for the ASW scenario; and six MIW LCS and one SUW LCS are 
recommended for the MIW scenario.  It is important to note that the surface threat was 
varied across the warfare areas.  This being the case, the number of SUW LCS should be 
altered as necessary based on the perceived size of the surface threat.  In general, a 
composition of five LCS configured for the primary threat and two LCS configured for 
the perceived secondary threat serves as a compositional rule of thumb.  While this 
composition may not be optimal, this thesis shows that it will produce dramatically lower 
Blue casualties than simply using a squadron of homogeneous composition. 
3. Effects of Sensors and Weapon Systems 
Different warfare areas rely on technology in different ways.  Through multiple 
regression, regression tree, and effects screening analysis, this thesis shows that sensors 
and weapon systems play a more significant role in the ASW and MIW scenarios.  Since 
none of the sensors and weapon systems are analytically identified as significant, the war 
adage that numbers matter is shown to hold true for the SUW scenario.  Conversely, 
several sensors and weapon systems are analytically identified as significant for the ASW 
and MIW scenarios; specifically Hellfire Pk, RAM Pk, SUW MH-60R Pd, ASW USV 
Pd, and Blue Torpedo Pk, and 57mm Pk respectively.  While unable to provide precise 
thresholds for most of these systems, this thesis shows that sensors and weapon systems 
play a significant role in predicting the MOEs. 
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
In addition to addressing the research questions, this thesis produced further 




1. Significance of Submarines in the SUW Scenario 
The use of multiple regression and regression tree analysis shows that the 
presence of submarines in the SUW scenario is the most significant factor in mean Blue 
casualties and mean LCS casualties.  Since submarines are the secondary threat in the 
SUW scenario, the employed LCS squadron searched for and engaged the primary threat 
of missile boats at a high rate of speed.  This tactic made use of the RMVs in the ASW 
mission package infeasible and produced easier targets for the enemy submarines.  The 
results of this thesis shows that the presence of enemy submarines requires the use of 
ASW tactics (i.e., slower speeds and maximized use of ASW sensors) to produce low 
mean Blue casualties. 
2. Limitations on the ASW Mission 
Regression tree analysis of the ASW scenario displays a disparity in the handling 
of enemy submarines.  Suggesting saturation numbers of LCS for low levels of 
submarines and low numbers of LCS when the threat is large gave rise to the thought that 
there may be a limit to the number of submarines a squadron of LCS can handle without 
support.  Further analysis shows that in situations where there are ten or more 
submarines, mean Blue casualties increase drastically and mean LCS casualties steadily 
rise.  The fact that no number or combination of LCS lowered casualties in situations 
where there are ten or more submarines suggests that additional fleet support should be 
provided if a LCS squadron is to operate in such an environment. 
3. Impact of Littoral Combat on the U. S. Navy Mindset 
A significant insight produced by this thesis is that in each scenario the employed 
LCS squadron suffered casualties.  With mean Blue casualties ranging from 2.99 to 17.3 
and mean LCS casualties ranging from 0.01 to 6.09 when employing a squadron of six to 
ten LCS, the Navy should expect casualties when engaging in the littorals.  This differs 
significantly from the detached engagement that the Navy has become accustomed to 
with the advent of missile technology, and will require a shift in mindset.  
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4. Simulating Operations 
The benefit of computer simulation is the ability to simulate numerous operations 
in the littorals without placing a single sailor at risk.  This thesis simulated 23,130 littoral 
combat operations exploring a broad range of values among the variables, which provides 
insight into a large number of possible outcomes.  The analysis of the results provides the 
lessons learned for these simulated littoral combat operations, which would have been 
costly in time, money, and blood if conducted in real life.  This by no means translates to 
operational experience, but provides valuable insight for future operations and 
demonstrates how simulation and data farming techniques can benefit the U.S. Navy. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this thesis support the following recommendations: 
• In order to produce low mean Blue casualties and high Red casualties, it is 
recommended the employed LCS squadron consist of six to ten LCS. 
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an SUW mission that 
may contain a submarine threat, it is recommended that a composition of 
at least five SUW LCS and two ASW LCS be implemented.  
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an ASW mission that 
may include a surface threat, it is recommended that a composition of at 
least five ASW LCS and one SUW LCS be implemented.  
• When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an MIW mission that 
may include a surface threat, it is recommended that a composition of six 
MIW LCS and at least one SUW LCS be implemented.  
• When considering the use of an employed LCS squadron for an ASW 
mission, it is recommended that additional fleet assets be provided to 
support the squadron if the expected number of enemy submarines is ten 
or more. 
• In situations where information regarding the disposition of enemy forces 
is unavailable, it is recommended that the compositional rule of thumb of 
five LCS configured for the primary threat and two LCS configured for 
the secondary threat be used. 
• Due to the inherent risk of littoral combat, it is recommended that a 
paradigm shift occur in the U. S. Navy such that both equipment and 
personnel casualties are expected and accepted. 
• When considering the use of an employed LCS squadron for a SUW 
mission that may contain a submarine threat, it is recommended that the 
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squadron pursue the SUW threat using tactics that allow for the 
maximized use of ASW sensors and weapon systems in order to produce 
lower Blue casualties. 
• The use of simulation and data farming helped provide valuable insight in 
short order for an asset that is not yet deployable.  It is recommended that 
simulation and data farming techniques be used in future U. S. Navy 
research to guide the development and deployment of new technologies. 
 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
While working on this thesis, the following items were identified as warranting 
further research: 
• Focused analysis of the sensors and weapon systems under development in 
order to provide recommended thresholds. 
• The possibility of interchanging sensors and weapon systems within the 
mission packages in order to provide a form of multi-mission capability 
for LCS. 
• Optimization of the mix of sensors and weapon systems in each mission 
package. 
• Possibility of establishing a multi-mission capability for the MH-60R/S to 
enable asset sharing across a heterogeneous employed LCS squadron. 
• Effects of communication or network failure among the unmanned 
vehicles on Blue force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
• Analysis of the impact of a mixed squadron, containing LCS and legacy 
surface platforms, on Blue force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
• Analysis of effects of logistic requirements and alternative modes of 
support and sustainment for both LCS and its mission packages on Blue 
force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
• Impact of an air threat on the employed LCS squadron. 
• Analysis of the impact of a mixed squadron, containing LCS and other 
non-surface platforms, on Blue force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
• Analysis of the effects of maintenance requirements and failure rates of 
helicopters and unmanned vehicles on Blue force casualties and mission 
effectiveness. 
• Analysis of the impact of using unmanned aerial vehicles in the event of 
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APPENDIX A.  PERSONALITIES AND CAPABILITIES OF 
AGENTS 
1
Modeling Summary – Missile Boats
Sensors and Speed:  Basic surface search with a detection range of 20 nm, and 
classification range of 12 nm.  Missile boats transit at a speed of 8 knots, attack at 
40 knots, and can travel at 15 knots when injured.
Personality Summary:  Missile boats commence attack as a group once they detect 
any blue forces.  When attacked by blue, they disperse from the area receiving fire. 
Their smaller sensor range does not allow them to capitalize on their long range 
missile capability.  Once an enemy is detected they pursue.  Number of missile 






Modeling Summary – Red Submarines
Sensors and Speed:  Submarine is assigned a detection range on surface targets of
20 nm but cannot classify until 8 nm.  Submarines are assigned an attack speed of 
15 knots and a patrol speed of 6 knots.  Due to the intended abstractness of this 
study, no concern was given to the various depth profiles normally associated with 
ASW problems.  
Personality Summary:  Enemy Submarines lie in waiting for Friendly forces 
entering the channel.  Once an enemy is detected they pursue and use torpedoes.  If 
they are fired upon they commence evasion procedures by taking randomly drawn 








Modeling Summary – Merchant Traffic
Sensors and Speed:  Merchant traffic is able to detect and classify targets at 20 nm.  
Due to the importance of timely delivered goods and fuel economy, Merchants 
always travel at 20 knots.  Anchored merchants remain anchored throughout the 
scenario.
Personality Summary:  Merchant traffic is used in the model as a realistic source of 
surface clutter complicating the operational picture for both red and blue.  Neither 
the friendly forces nor the enemy forces have an interest in investigating, impeding, 
or attacking merchant traffic.  Merchants are able to be attacked and no 
consideration for their safety is taken into account by either side when engaging the 
enemy.  The number of Merchants will be varied through the NOLH.
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Modeling Summary – SUW LCS
Sensors and Speed:  For LCS detection and classification are linked because there
will be a probability associated with its detection.  LCS is assigned a detection 
range of 50 nm and its Probability of Detection will be varied through the NOLH 
with a range of .5 – 1.0.  LCS has a transit speed of 20 knots, and an attack speed of 
40 knots.  If injured, LCS will be able to travel at its transit speed.
Personality Summary:  The SUW Scenario is designed to model a LCS Squadron 
transiting a channel to clear it of any surface threats.  Upon commencement, SUW 
LCS are following assigned PIM into the channel with an embarked MH-60R 
airborne.  Upon enemy detection, squadron will detach LCS gaining detection and 
order pursuit with a kill objective.  Once the enemy is neutralized, LCS will return 
to PIM.  Since LCS is a focused mission platform, a SUW LCS will not pursue 
anything other than a surface threat (i.e. it will not pursue, and cannot detect, a 
submarine).  The number of SUW LCS will be varied through the NOLH.
21NOLH10 nmRAM
3000NOLH3 nm30 mm









Modeling Summary – SUW MH-60R
Sensors and Speed:  The MH-60R is assigned a detection range of 75 nm and its probability 
of detection will be varied through the NOLH with a range of .5 – 1.0.  The UAV will have a 
sensor range of 20 nm and its probability of detection will also be varied through the NOLH 
with a range of .5 – 1.0.  The MH-60R transits at an operational speed of 144 knots, and the 
UAV will transit at 80 knots.
Personality Summary:  The assumption is that the LCS will operate with its MH-60R airborne 
as opposed to the UAV.  This being the case, each LCS will have their MH-60R airborne at 
scenario start.  Modeling an initial use of a UAV due to a MH-60R being down because of 
maintenance is still being considered, but may be left for further research.  The MH-60R 
follows the LCS PIM in station with LCS.  Once the MH-60R detects an enemy it will pursue 
but will maintain a standoff distance of 20 nm until LCS is able to close, due to the short 
reach of its weaponry.  Once LCS has closed the MH-60R, the MH-60R will approach the 
enemy with the LCS.  Since this MH-60R is assigned to an SUW LCS, it will not pursue or 
attack anything other than a surface threat.  Each SUW LCS is assigned 1 SUW MH-60R.
To model the loss of a MH-60R due to combat, the MH-60R is given 100 per cent 
concealment when it is injured and its sole desire is to find a friendly platform.  Once a 
friendly platform is found, its concealment is returned to 0 per cent and its MH-60R attributes 
are replaced with those of the UAV.  Due to the MH-60R standoff distance this option is not 





Modeling Summary – ASW LCS
Sensors and Speeds:  With regards to sensors and speed, the ASW LCS is no different than the SUW LCS.
Personality Summary:  The ASW LCS is in escort mode for this scenario, thus it is not patrolling a barrier 
and the SUW LCS is not necessarily following behind the ASW LCS (positions are randomized within the 
friendly start box at problem start).  ASW LCS is assigned the same PIM as SUW LCS.  Once an enemy is 
detected it will pursue.  While the ASW LCS has weaponry to engage both surface and subsurface contacts, 
it will engage enemy submarines with a priority over enemy surface threats.  Further, the enemy submarine 
engagement will be conducted with the MH-60R.  Since the ASW LCS does not have a way to deliver an 
ASW weapon, it is assigned a 10 nm standoff from a detected submarine.  Once the subsurface threat is 
neutralized the ASW LCS will continue on PIM and is available to assist the SUW LCS in a surface 
engagement.
There is a slight modeling issue regarding the ASW LCS detecting the submarine at 50 nm.  This 
occurs because the submarine is essentially modeled like a surface contact, and the non-ASW assets (SUW 
LCS and SUW MH-60R/UAV) are simply told not to pursue that specific enemy.  While this is a problem, I 
believe it is resolved through the fact that the ASW LCS cannot engage a submarine due to its lack of 
organic delivery of an ASW weapon (no SVTT).  This being the case, while ASW LCS detects the 
submarine early the submarine isn’t engaged until the MH-60R detects the submarine and pursues.  The 
ASW LCS does act as a torpedo re-loader for the MH-60R which can only carry 3 torpedoes.
5000NOLH1 nm.50 Cal MG
21NOLH10 nmRAM
3000NOLH3 nm30 mm








Modeling Summary – ASW MH-60R
Sensors and Speed:  With regard to speed, the ASW MH-60R is modeled exactly 
the same as the SUW MH-60R/UAV.  For sensors, however, the ASW MH-60R is 
given a sensor range of 22 nm with a probability of detection that will be varied 
through the NOLH with a range of .5 – 1.0.  This is to model the A/N-AQS-22 
system that the MH-60R will be using to find the submarine.  The A/N-AQS-22 is a 
system that is designed to be operated by a MH-60R in a hover, but I am not 
capable of modeling that in MANA.  This may be one of the modeling issues I 
concede to the ASW field.
Personality Summary:  The ASW MH-60R acts just like the SUW MH-60R/UAV 
(see above).  Once an enemy is detected the ASW MH-60R will pursue and engage.  
Since the ASW MH-60R only has 3 torpedoes, once its primary ammunition is 
expended it transits to a reloading waypoint.  Once the ASW MH-60R reaches the 
waypoint it is given 3 more torpedoes and is able to re-engage the enemy.  A 
reloading waypoint is used to simulate the ASW MH-60R returning to its respective 
ASW LCS for an ammunition reload.  Once the subsurface enemy is neutralized, 
the ASW MH-60R will continue to transit PIM and may assist in a surface 
engagement.








Sensors and Speed:  For sensors an Unmanned Surface Vehicle is assigned per 
sensor, and is given a range of 5 nm with a probability of detection that will be 
varied through the NOLH with a range of .5 – 1.0.  A speed of advance of 12 knots 
is given to the USVs as they operate much like the ASW MH-60R (dipping sonar) 
but with a lower maximum speed in between dips.  
Personality Summary:  The ASW USVs transit at a speed of 12 knots while looking 
for enemy submarines.  Once a submarine is detected the ASW USV will close to 











Sensors and Speed:  For sensors an Remotely Manned Vehicle is assigned per 
sensor, and is given a range of 5 nm with a probability of detection that will be 
varied through the NOLH with a range of .5 – 1.0.  A speed of advance of 12 knots 
is given to the RMVs as they operate much like the ASW MH-60R (dipping sonar) 
but with a lower maximum speed in between dips.  
Personality Summary:  The ASW RMVs transit at a speed of 12 knots while 
looking for enemy submarines.  Once a submarine is detected the ASW RMV will 




Modeling Summary – MIW LCS
Sensors and Speeds:  With regards to sensors and speed, the MIW LCS is no different than the SUW LCS.
Personality Summary:  The MIW LCS and its off board vehicles are transiting the littoral area to clear it of 
mines, and, as such, all off board vehicles are deployed at problem start.   SUW LCS are transiting the 
channel with the MIW LCS to protect them in the event of a missile boat attack.  While the MIW LCS has 
weaponry to engage both surface and subsurface contacts, it will engage mines with a priority over enemy 
surface threats.  Further, the mine engagement will be conducted with the MH-60S. Once the subsurface 
threat is neutralized the MIW LCS will continue transiting the channel and is available to assist the SUW 
LCS in the event of a surface engagement.
There is a slight modeling issue regarding the MIW LCS detecting the mines at 50 nm.  This occurs 
because the mine is essentially modeled like a surface contact, and the non-MIW assets (SUW LCS and 
SUW MH-60R/UAV) are simply told not to pursue that specific enemy.  While this is a problem, I believe 
it is resolved through the fact that the MIW LCS cannot engage a mine.  This being the case, while MIW 
LCS detects the mine early the mine cannot be cleared until the MH-60S detects the mine and pursues.  The 
MIW LCS does act as a re-loader for the MH-60S.
5000NOLH1 nm.50 Cal MG
21NOLH10 nmRAM
3000NOLH3 nm30 mm








Modeling Summary – MIW MH-60S
Sensors and Speed:  For sensors the ASW MH-60R is given a sensor range 
of 5 nm with a probability of detection that will be varied through the 
NOLH with a range of .5 – 1.0.  The sensor is abstractly modeling the 
detection capabilities of the MIW MH-60S, and not a specific system.  The 
MIW MH-60S needs to refuel every 3 hrs.
Personality Summary:  Once a mine is detected by or is passed to the MIW 
MH-60S, it will pursue and engage.  The MIW MH-60S is the only 
clearance platform available to LCS in this scenario.  It has the use of a 
generic weapon to neutralize mines, and is required to transit to a waypoint 
to simulate reloading.  The characteristics of the MH-60S clearance 






Modeling Summary – MIW USV
NOLH5 nmMk104
PdRangeSensor
Sensors and Speed:  For sensors an Unmanned Surface Vehicle is given a range of 
5 nm with a probability of detection that will be varied through the NOLH with a 
range of .5 – 1.0.  A speed of 25 knots is given to the USVs.
Personality Summary:  The MIW USVs transit at a speed of 25 knots while looking 
for mines, but will stay within 15 nm of MIW LCS .  Once a mine is detected the 
MIW USV will close to help localize the enemy, and pass the information to the 







Modeling Summary – MIW RMV
NOLH5 nmAN/AQS-20A
PdRangeSensor
Sensors and Speed:  For sensors an Remotely Manned Vehicle is given a range of 5 
nm with a probability of detection that will be varied through the NOLH with a 
range of .5 – 1.0.  The RMV can operate at speeds ranging from 8 – 15 kts
depending on the towing length of the sensor.  A speed of 12 knots is given to the 
RMVs as an average speed.  
Personality Summary:  The MIW RMVs transit at a speed of 12 knots while 
looking for mines.  Once a mine is detected the MIW RMV will close to help 








































APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
This appendix illustrates the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLH) used 
to conduct the simulation experiment, and their associated correlation matrices.  Since no 
changes were made to the preliminary designs prior to running the full experiment, only 
the full designs are shown.  Due to the size of the full designs, only the first 50 rows are 
provided.  Correlation values larger than 0.03 are highlighted in yellow for easy 
identification. 

















l o w  l e v e l 1 5 0 0 0
h i g h  l e v e l 3 0 5 0 1 1 1
d e c i m a l s 0 0 3 3 3
f a c t o r  n a m e L C S S w a r m P d P c P i
2 2 7 0 . 3 5 9 0 . 3 2 8 0 . 1 2 5
2 9 3 7 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 4 2 2 0 . 3 4 4
2 7 2 1 0 . 9 5 3 0 . 2 1 9 0 . 2 9 7
2 0 4 5 0 . 7 1 9 0 . 4 5 3 0 . 0 6 3
2 8 2 6 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 9 4
1 6 4 6 0 . 2 3 4 0 . 4 8 4 0 . 1 5 6
2 3 1 3 0 . 5 3 1 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 2 5
2 5 3 9 0 . 9 2 2 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 3 7 5
2 1 6 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 8 1 3 0 . 4 0 6
2 9 3 6 0 . 4 8 4 0 . 7 6 6 0
1 6 6 0 . 9 6 9 0 . 5 3 1 0 . 2 0 3
3 0 2 8 0 . 6 8 8 0 . 9 2 2 0 . 1 7 2
1 7 1 5 0 . 3 2 8 0 . 6 4 1 0 . 3 9 1
2 4 3 0 0 . 4 2 2 0 . 8 9 1 0 . 2 6 6
1 8 2 0 0 . 7 8 1 0 . 9 5 3 0 . 4 3 8
2 0 3 1 0 . 5 4 7 0 . 7 1 9 0 . 1 4 1
2 6 2 5 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 6 7 2
1 7 4 4 0 . 2 6 6 0 . 3 4 4 0 . 5 7 8
2 2 2 3 0 . 5 6 3 0 . 2 9 7 0 . 7 8 1
1 9 3 8 0 . 8 5 9 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 5 4 7
2 5 1 4 0 . 4 0 6 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 9 8 4
2 4 4 2 0 0 . 1 5 6 0 . 5 1 6
3 0 2 3 0 . 7 9 7 0 . 2 5 0 . 9 6 9
1 8 5 0 0 . 8 2 8 0 . 3 7 5 0 . 6 8 8
1 9 1 6 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 5 9 4 0 . 8 1 3
2 3 3 3 0 . 1 5 6 1 0 . 7 6 6
2 5 9 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 9 7 0 . 5 3 1
2 7 4 3 0 . 6 2 5 0 . 8 2 8 0 . 9 2 2
2 8 1 8 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 6 0 9 0 . 6 4 1
2 1 4 7 0 . 3 4 4 0 . 7 3 4 0 . 8 9 1
2 0 1 1 0 . 7 0 3 0 . 5 6 3 0 . 9 5 3
2 6 3 5 0 . 9 3 8 0 . 8 5 9 0 . 7 1 9
1 6 2 8 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5
9 4 8 0 . 6 4 1 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 8 7 5
2 1 8 0 . 8 9 1 0 . 5 7 8 0 . 6 5 6
4 3 4 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 7 8 1 0 . 7 0 3
1 1 1 0 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 5 4 7 0 . 9 3 8
3 2 9 0 . 8 1 3 0 . 9 8 4 0 . 9 0 6
1 5 9 0 . 7 6 6 0 . 5 1 6 0 . 8 4 4
8 4 2 0 . 4 6 9 0 . 9 6 9 0 . 7 5
6 1 6 0 . 0 7 8 0 . 6 8 8 0 . 6 2 5
1 0 4 9 0 . 9 8 4 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 5 9 4
2 1 9 0 . 5 1 6 0 . 2 3 4 1
1 5 4 9 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 4 6 9 0 . 7 9 7
1 2 7 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 0 7 8 0 . 8 2 8
1 4 4 0 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 3 5 9 0 . 6 0 9
7 2 5 0 . 5 7 8 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 7 3 4
1 3 3 5 0 . 2 1 9 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 5 6 3
1 1 2 4 0 . 4 5 3 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 8 5 9
5 3 0 0 . 6 0 9 0 . 8 7 5 0 . 3 2 8
1 4 1 1 0 . 7 3 4 0 . 6 5 6 0 . 4 2 2
9 3 2 0 . 4 3 8 0 . 7 0 3 0 . 2 1 9
1 2 1 7 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 9 3 8 0 . 4 5 3
6 4 1 0 . 5 9 4 0 . 9 0 6 0 . 0 1 6
7 1 3 1 0 . 8 4 4 0 . 4 8 4
1 3 2 0 . 2 0 3 0 . 7 5 0 . 0 3 1
1 3 5 0 . 1 7 2 0 . 6 2 5 0 . 3 1 3
1 2 3 9 0 . 9 0 6 0 . 4 0 6 0 . 1 8 8
8 2 2 0 . 8 4 4 0 0 . 2 3 4
6 4 6 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 0 3 0 . 4 6 9
4 1 2 0 . 3 7 5 0 . 1 7 2 0 . 0 7 8
3 3 7 0 . 8 7 5 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 3 5 9
1 0 8 0 . 6 5 6 0 . 2 6 6 0 . 1 0 9
1 1 4 4 0 . 2 9 7 0 . 4 3 8 0 . 0 4 7
5 2 0 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 2 8 1
LCS S warm P d P c P i
LCS 1
S warm -0.00791 1
P d 0.002397 0.006462 1
P c -0.00298 0.003743 -4.4E -08 1
P i -0.01044 0.003707 -4.4E -08 -4.4E -08 1
Correlation Matrix 
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B. SUW FULL DESIGN 
elements[] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
low level 1 0 5 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
high level 30 5 50 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
decimals 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
factor name SUW LCS ASW LCS Red MB Red Sub Merchants 57 mm Pk .50 Cal Pk Ram Pk LCS Pd SUW H Pd Hellfire Pk NLOS Pk 30 mm Pk ASW H Pd Torp Pk ASW O Pd
1 13 4 32 3 3 0.949 1 0.938 0.594 0.533 0.619 0.693 0.531 0.592 0.67 0.697
2 4 2 43 5 4 0.766 0.986 0.922 0.771 0.805 0.813 0.871 1 0.943 0.756 0.512
3 6 3 10 3 5 0.906 0.971 0.945 0.822 0.682 0.602 0.623 0.564 0.572 0.969 0.916
4 13 1 23 4 4 0.873 0.939 0.975 0.576 0.773 0.969 0.891 0.982 0.977 0.822 0.791
5 12 3 33 3 5 0.896 0.877 0.844 0.533 0.908 0.543 0.527 0.66 0.539 0.752 0.58
6 14 2 48 2 4 0.953 0.867 0.977 0.861 0.729 0.92 0.881 0.92 0.854 0.957 0.713
7 2 3 25 1 3 0.76 0.883 0.793 0.836 0.793 0.502 0.635 0.654 0.66 0.572 0.955
8 12 0 22 3 5 0.871 0.85 0.84 0.742 0.535 0.732 0.766 0.904 0.826 0.713 0.953
9 3 3 47 4 2 0.893 0.869 0.99 0.588 0.691 0.973 0.615 0.729 0.715 0.592 0.828
10 15 0 44 4 0 0.805 0.783 0.775 0.979 0.875 0.701 0.842 0.879 0.975 0.566 0.779
11 5 5 27 5 2 0.752 0.988 0.799 0.951 0.643 0.822 0.605 0.605 0.701 0.824 0.551
12 3 1 8 4 2 0.834 0.885 0.811 0.746 0.994 0.719 0.746 0.99 0.818 0.859 0.717
13 9 5 33 1 2 0.898 0.822 0.832 0.686 0.969 0.883 0.604 0.521 0.736 0.906 0.834
14 2 1 37 2 1 0.9 0.994 0.756 0.857 0.59 0.676 0.889 0.836 0.83 0.801 0.934
15 9 3 7 3 1 0.764 0.881 0.781 0.869 0.986 0.783 0.633 0.523 0.574 0.555 0.652
16 12 1 17 1 2 0.861 0.969 0.928 0.553 0.752 0.506 0.764 0.887 0.789 0.588 0.684
17 9 3 41 4 4 0.686 0.82 0.83 0.578 0.684 0.754 0.826 0.561 0.664 0.666 0.668
18 15 1 41 3 3 0.641 0.926 0.838 0.887 0.893 0.953 0.621 0.805 0.814 0.738 0.586
19 7 4 26 3 4 0.52 0.936 0.895 0.838 0.615 0.621 0.861 0.578 0.549 0.846 0.764
20 7 1 17 4 4 0.635 0.889 0.959 0.732 0.717 0.902 0.51 0.928 0.904 0.887 0.924
21 11 3 40 2 4 0.535 0.992 0.982 0.688 0.871 0.514 0.898 0.555 0.584 0.963 0.648
22 15 2 32 2 5 0.568 0.934 0.912 0.883 0.559 0.871 0.521 0.975 0.992 0.742 0.637
23 12 4 27 3 3 0.742 0.891 0.863 0.844 0.869 0.609 0.947 0.586 0.678 0.648 0.992
24 7 2 20 2 4 0.537 0.908 0.828 0.738 0.693 0.742 0.752 0.867 0.871 0.627 0.84
25 8 3 41 5 1 0.693 0.768 0.998 0.535 0.744 0.811 0.916 0.646 0.527 0.705 0.883
26 15 1 46 3 2 0.521 0.842 0.943 0.879 0.951 0.607 0.627 0.742 0.98 0.65 0.756
27 4 4 27 4 2 0.721 0.803 0.904 0.859 0.621 0.836 0.775 0.645 0.729 0.777 0.711
28 7 0 17 4 2 0.684 0.848 0.771 0.736 0.902 0.762 0.711 0.783 0.902 0.99 0.621
29 8 4 45 2 1 0.703 0.918 0.887 0.744 0.988 0.875 0.887 0.615 0.689 0.924 0.902
30 6 1 29 1 1 0.58 0.875 0.787 0.949 0.604 0.578 0.715 0.898 0.869 0.82 0.693
31 15 4 13 3 2 0.559 0.836 0.955 0.855 0.832 0.844 0.797 0.705 0.529 0.561 0.592
32 4 2 16 2 1 0.699 0.77 0.967 0.605 0.736 0.711 0.57 0.818 0.949 0.609 0.533
33 14 3 43 3 3 1 0.551 0.854 0.666 0.699 0.57 0.514 0.791 0.713 0.57 0.59
34 11 2 39 4 4 0.986 0.734 0.789 0.953 0.791 0.807 0.982 0.582 0.875 0.689 0.613
35 8 4 20 3 4 0.971 0.594 0.785 0.789 0.658 0.605 0.588 0.908 0.545 0.775 0.922
36 6 1 26 4 4 0.939 0.627 0.984 0.715 0.799 0.926 0.975 0.607 0.795 0.771 0.873
37 10 3 29 2 5 0.877 0.604 0.916 0.709 0.865 0.523 0.654 0.973 0.727 0.734 0.529
38 12 2 36 2 4 0.867 0.547 0.791 0.787 0.588 0.984 0.924 0.617 0.922 0.781 0.574
39 10 3 23 2 4 0.883 0.74 0.846 0.877 0.77 0.564 0.656 0.896 0.662 0.596 0.93
40 14 2 19 3 4 0.85 0.629 0.857 0.734 0.652 0.877 0.932 0.748 0.867 0.557 0.982
41 6 4 49 4 2 0.869 0.607 0.855 0.582 0.6 0.85 0.676 0.813 0.676 0.553 0.818
42 7 1 44 4 2 0.783 0.695 0.809 0.988 0.855 0.748 0.822 0.611 0.844 0.584 0.855
43 5 5 15 4 2 0.988 0.748 0.973 0.955 0.641 0.828 0.594 0.848 0.709 0.9 0.656
44 1 1 13 4 2 0.885 0.666 0.813 0.629 0.961 0.709 0.988 0.762 0.988 0.896 0.768
45 7 4 34 1 1 0.822 0.602 0.754 0.598 0.977 0.854 0.523 0.916 0.518 0.857 0.734
46 5 1 43 2 1 0.994 0.6 0.951 0.9 0.564 0.535 0.836 0.625 0.74 0.949 0.805
47 5 3 11 2 2 0.881 0.736 0.795 0.93 0.92 0.73 0.563 0.873 0.734 0.523 0.604
48 11 1 15 2 2 0.969 0.639 0.773 0.604 0.619 0.631 0.941 0.76 0.816 0.521 0.549
49 3 4 34 4 5 0.68 0.686 0.762 0.504 0.689 0.537 0.936 0.859 0.553 0.633 0.539
50 8 0 49 3 5 0.574 0.641 0.961 0.801 0.826 1 0.643 0.672 0.746 0.504 0.523  
SUW LCS ASW LCS Red MB Red Sub Merchants 57 mm Pk .50 Cal Pk Ram Pk LCS Pd SUW H Pd Hellfire Pk NLOS Pk 30 mm Pk ASW H Pd Torp Pk ASW O Pd
SUW LCS 1
ASW LCS -0.013456 1
Red MB 0.000576 0.00561 1
Red Sub -0.005267 -0.021084 0.022342 1
Merchants 0.012379 0.000429 -0.007894 -0.016869 1
57 mm Pk -0.001289 0.016836 0.002811 0.021747 0.001769 1
.50 Cal Pk -0.000456 -0.001144 -0.002239 0.00671 0.020929 -2.88E-09 1
Ram Pk 0.002217 -0.002252 -0.000585 0.032938 0.019231 -2.88E-09 -2.885E-09 1
LCS Pd 0.00119 -0.00395 -0.003184 -0.028436 0.000536 -0.002098 0.0012476 0.000493 1
SUW H Pd 0.000507 -0.004093 -0.000319 -0.00741 0.055852 -0.000697 -0.0006873 5.74E-06 -0.003554 1
Hellfire Pk 0.003604 -0.006398 0.000914 0.017922 -0.014816 0.000413 5.558E-06 -0.002123 0.001026 -0.00135638 1
NLOS Pk 0.002456 0.02302 0.002261 0.04909 -0.013941 -0.00061 0.000852 -0.000868 0.001876 8.1736E-05 0.00032 1
30 mm Pk -0.00546 -0.017891 0.001133 0.010557 0.027077 -0.001945 -0.0013873 0.000737 -6.62E-05 -0.00197711 -0.000416 -0.002106 1
ASW H Pd -0.00953 0.005487 -0.001944 0.001551 -0.010187 0.000623 0.0008137 0.001034 0.001039 -0.00101145 0.000895 5.69E-05 0.000669 1
Torp Pk 0.004909 -0.007238 0.000914 0.012589 0.021787 0.000981 -4.152E-05 0.001067 -9.3E-05 -0.00140365 0.001877 2.17E-05 -0.00103 -0.001199 1






C. ASW FULL DESIGN 
Elements[] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Low Level 0 1 0 5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
High Level 7 30 20 30 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Decimals 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Factor SUW LCS ASW LCS Red MB Red Sub Merchants 57mm Pk .50 Cal Pk RAM Pk LCS Pd SUW H Pd Hellfire Pk NLOS Pk 30 mm Pk ASW H Pd Torp Pk USV Pd RMV Pd
1 3 27 12 20 3 0.949 1 0.938 0.594 0.533 0.619 0.693 0.531 0.592 0.67 0.697 0.723
2 1 13 17 29 4 0.766 0.986 0.922 0.771 0.805 0.813 0.871 1 0.943 0.756 0.512 0.531
3 1 18 2 19 5 0.906 0.971 0.945 0.822 0.682 0.602 0.623 0.564 0.572 0.969 0.916 0.783
4 3 6 8 21 4 0.873 0.939 0.975 0.576 0.773 0.969 0.891 0.982 0.977 0.822 0.791 0.895
5 3 17 12 15 5 0.896 0.877 0.844 0.533 0.908 0.543 0.527 0.66 0.539 0.752 0.58 0.574
6 3 12 19 9 4 0.953 0.867 0.977 0.861 0.729 0.92 0.881 0.92 0.854 0.957 0.713 0.691
7 0 19 9 8 3 0.76 0.883 0.793 0.836 0.793 0.502 0.635 0.654 0.66 0.572 0.955 0.957
8 3 2 7 15 5 0.871 0.85 0.84 0.742 0.535 0.732 0.766 0.904 0.826 0.713 0.953 0.865
9 1 16 19 21 2 0.893 0.869 0.99 0.588 0.691 0.973 0.615 0.729 0.715 0.592 0.828 0.703
10 3 3 17 23 0 0.805 0.783 0.775 0.979 0.875 0.701 0.842 0.879 0.975 0.566 0.779 0.721
11 1 28 10 29 2 0.752 0.988 0.799 0.951 0.643 0.822 0.605 0.605 0.701 0.824 0.551 0.885
12 0 5 1 23 2 0.834 0.885 0.811 0.746 0.994 0.719 0.746 0.99 0.818 0.859 0.717 0.799
13 2 29 13 7 2 0.898 0.822 0.832 0.686 0.969 0.883 0.604 0.521 0.736 0.906 0.834 0.629
14 0 9 14 8 1 0.9 0.994 0.756 0.857 0.59 0.676 0.889 0.836 0.83 0.801 0.934 0.711
15 2 19 1 17 1 0.764 0.881 0.781 0.869 0.986 0.783 0.633 0.523 0.574 0.555 0.652 0.92
16 3 9 5 7 2 0.861 0.969 0.928 0.553 0.752 0.506 0.764 0.887 0.789 0.588 0.684 0.854
17 2 16 16 25 4 0.686 0.82 0.83 0.578 0.684 0.754 0.826 0.561 0.664 0.666 0.668 0.914
18 3 9 16 20 3 0.641 0.926 0.838 0.887 0.893 0.953 0.621 0.805 0.814 0.738 0.586 0.943
19 1 24 9 18 4 0.52 0.936 0.895 0.838 0.615 0.621 0.861 0.578 0.549 0.846 0.764 0.693
20 1 7 6 22 4 0.635 0.889 0.959 0.732 0.717 0.902 0.51 0.928 0.904 0.887 0.924 0.643
21 2 16 16 10 4 0.535 0.992 0.982 0.688 0.871 0.514 0.898 0.555 0.584 0.963 0.648 0.959
22 3 11 12 10 5 0.568 0.934 0.912 0.883 0.559 0.871 0.521 0.975 0.992 0.742 0.637 0.709
23 3 24 10 17 3 0.742 0.891 0.863 0.844 0.869 0.609 0.947 0.586 0.678 0.648 0.992 0.551
24 2 12 7 12 4 0.537 0.908 0.828 0.738 0.693 0.742 0.752 0.867 0.871 0.627 0.84 0.5
25 2 16 16 27 1 0.693 0.768 0.998 0.535 0.744 0.811 0.916 0.646 0.527 0.705 0.883 0.883
26 3 8 18 18 2 0.521 0.842 0.943 0.879 0.951 0.607 0.627 0.742 0.98 0.65 0.756 0.758
27 1 24 10 25 2 0.721 0.803 0.904 0.859 0.621 0.836 0.775 0.645 0.729 0.777 0.711 0.564
28 1 4 5 24 2 0.684 0.848 0.771 0.736 0.902 0.762 0.711 0.783 0.902 0.99 0.621 0.652
29 2 25 18 10 1 0.703 0.918 0.887 0.744 0.988 0.875 0.887 0.615 0.689 0.924 0.902 0.768
30 1 8 11 7 1 0.58 0.875 0.787 0.949 0.604 0.578 0.715 0.898 0.869 0.82 0.693 0.945
31 3 27 4 17 2 0.559 0.836 0.955 0.855 0.832 0.844 0.797 0.705 0.529 0.561 0.592 0.576
32 1 15 5 11 1 0.699 0.77 0.967 0.605 0.736 0.711 0.57 0.818 0.949 0.609 0.533 0.713
33 3 20 17 18 3 1 0.551 0.854 0.666 0.699 0.57 0.514 0.791 0.713 0.57 0.59 0.594
34 2 14 15 22 4 0.986 0.734 0.789 0.953 0.791 0.807 0.982 0.582 0.875 0.689 0.613 0.527
35 2 25 7 20 4 0.971 0.594 0.785 0.789 0.658 0.605 0.588 0.908 0.545 0.775 0.922 0.996
36 1 8 9 22 4 0.939 0.627 0.984 0.715 0.799 0.926 0.975 0.607 0.795 0.771 0.873 0.994
37 2 19 11 9 5 0.877 0.604 0.916 0.709 0.865 0.523 0.654 0.973 0.727 0.734 0.529 0.598
38 3 10 14 11 4 0.867 0.547 0.791 0.787 0.588 0.984 0.924 0.617 0.922 0.781 0.574 0.621
39 2 17 8 13 4 0.883 0.74 0.846 0.877 0.77 0.564 0.656 0.896 0.662 0.596 0.93 0.842
40 3 10 6 17 4 0.85 0.629 0.857 0.734 0.652 0.877 0.932 0.748 0.867 0.557 0.982 0.891
41 1 24 20 21 2 0.869 0.607 0.855 0.582 0.6 0.85 0.676 0.813 0.676 0.553 0.818 0.682
42 2 6 17 26 2 0.783 0.695 0.809 0.988 0.855 0.748 0.822 0.611 0.844 0.584 0.855 0.52
43 1 30 4 27 2 0.988 0.748 0.973 0.955 0.641 0.828 0.594 0.848 0.709 0.9 0.656 0.867
44 0 5 4 24 2 0.885 0.666 0.813 0.629 0.961 0.709 0.988 0.762 0.988 0.896 0.768 0.846
45 2 26 13 5 1 0.822 0.602 0.754 0.598 0.977 0.854 0.523 0.916 0.518 0.857 0.734 0.502
46 1 7 17 8 1 0.994 0.6 0.951 0.9 0.564 0.535 0.836 0.625 0.74 0.949 0.805 0.676
47 1 20 3 10 2 0.881 0.736 0.795 0.93 0.92 0.73 0.563 0.873 0.734 0.523 0.604 0.967
48 3 5 4 10 2 0.969 0.639 0.773 0.604 0.619 0.631 0.941 0.76 0.816 0.521 0.549 0.811
49 0 23 13 23 5 0.68 0.686 0.762 0.504 0.689 0.537 0.936 0.859 0.553 0.633 0.539 0.939
50 2 3 20 19 5 0.574 0.641 0.961 0.801 0.826 1 0.643 0.672 0.746 0.504 0.523 0.908
 
SUW LCS ASW LCS Red MB Red Sub Merchants 57mm Pk .50 Cal Pk RAM Pk LCS Pd SUW H Pd Hellfire Pk NLOS Pk 30 mm Pk ASW H Pd Torp Pk USV Pd RMV Pd
SUW LCS 1
ASW LCS 0.019014 1
Red MB -0.004872 0.007462 1
Red Sub 0.013336 0.005079 -0.003963 1
Merchants -0.018113 -0.014435 -0.009802 0.007575 1
57mm Pk 0.002133 -0.002358 -0.007655 0.002374 0.0017693 1
.50 Cal Pk 0.012576 0.001941 -0.00189 -0.002196 0.0209287 -2.88E-09 1
RAM Pk 0.009661 0.000235 0.004172 -0.001091 0.0192308 -2.88E-09 -2.88E-09 1
LCS Pd 0.006761 0.00534 -0.005281 -0.004278 0.0005361 -0.002098 0.001248 0.000493 1
SUW H Pd -0.006882 0.002111 -0.001058 -0.004695 0.0558517 -0.000697 -0.000687 5.74E-06 -0.003554 1
Hellfire Pk -0.005965 -0.000219 -0.000231 -0.000129 -0.014816 0.000413 5.56E-06 -0.002123 0.001026 -0.001356 1
NLOS Pk 0.007092 -0.004688 -4.69E-06 0.000983 -0.013941 -0.00061 0.000852 -0.000868 0.001876 8.174E-05 0.00032 1
30 mm Pk -0.008099 0.000176 -0.000116 -0.00667 0.0270769 -0.001945 -0.001387 0.000737 -6.62E-05 -0.001977 -0.000416 -0.002106 1
ASW H Pd -0.00601 -0.000627 -0.003932 0.004122 -0.010187 0.000623 0.000814 0.001034 0.001039 -0.001011 0.000895 5.69E-05 0.000669 1
Torp Pk 0.004778 0.003157 0.001312 -0.001227 0.0217866 0.000981 -4.15E-05 0.001067 -9.3E-05 -0.001404 0.001877 2.17E-05 -0.00103 -0.001199 1
USV Pd -0.004643 0.001728 0.001649 -0.001908 0.0120282 -0.000501 0.002151 -0.000777 0.000511 -0.002811 -0.000577 -3.21E-05 0.002938 -0.0018446 0.001099 1







D. MIW FULL DESIGN 
Elements[] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Low Level 1 0 0 20 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
High Level 30 7 15 200 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Decimals 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Factor MIW LCS SUW LCS Red MB Mines Merchants LCS Pd MIW H Pd SUW H Pd NLOS Pk 57mm Pk 30mm Pk RAM Pk .50 Cal Pk Clearance Pk Hellfire Pk MIW USV Pd MIW RMV Pd
1 13 6 9 130 3 0.949 1 0.938 0.594 0.533 0.619 0.693 0.531 0.592 0.67 0.697 0.723
2 4 3 13 192 4 0.766 0.986 0.922 0.771 0.805 0.813 0.871 1 0.943 0.756 0.512 0.531
3 6 4 2 121 5 0.906 0.971 0.945 0.822 0.682 0.602 0.623 0.564 0.572 0.969 0.916 0.783
4 13 1 6 134 4 0.873 0.939 0.975 0.576 0.773 0.969 0.891 0.982 0.977 0.822 0.791 0.895
5 12 4 9 93 5 0.896 0.877 0.844 0.533 0.908 0.543 0.527 0.66 0.539 0.752 0.58 0.574
6 14 3 14 49 4 0.953 0.867 0.977 0.861 0.729 0.92 0.881 0.92 0.854 0.957 0.713 0.691
7 2 4 7 41 3 0.76 0.883 0.793 0.836 0.793 0.502 0.635 0.654 0.66 0.572 0.955 0.957
8 12 0 6 92 5 0.871 0.85 0.84 0.742 0.535 0.732 0.766 0.904 0.826 0.713 0.953 0.865
9 3 4 14 133 2 0.893 0.869 0.99 0.588 0.691 0.973 0.615 0.729 0.715 0.592 0.828 0.703
10 15 1 13 149 0 0.805 0.783 0.775 0.979 0.875 0.701 0.842 0.879 0.975 0.566 0.779 0.721
11 5 7 7 193 2 0.752 0.988 0.799 0.951 0.643 0.822 0.605 0.605 0.701 0.824 0.551 0.885
12 3 1 1 151 2 0.834 0.885 0.811 0.746 0.994 0.719 0.746 0.99 0.818 0.859 0.717 0.799
13 9 7 9 33 2 0.898 0.822 0.832 0.686 0.969 0.883 0.604 0.521 0.736 0.906 0.834 0.629
14 2 2 11 45 1 0.9 0.994 0.756 0.857 0.59 0.676 0.889 0.836 0.83 0.801 0.934 0.711
15 9 4 1 107 1 0.764 0.881 0.781 0.869 0.986 0.783 0.633 0.523 0.574 0.555 0.652 0.92
16 12 2 4 33 2 0.861 0.969 0.928 0.553 0.752 0.506 0.764 0.887 0.789 0.588 0.684 0.854
17 9 4 12 161 4 0.686 0.82 0.83 0.578 0.684 0.754 0.826 0.561 0.664 0.666 0.668 0.914
18 15 2 12 130 3 0.641 0.926 0.838 0.887 0.893 0.953 0.621 0.805 0.814 0.738 0.586 0.943
19 7 6 7 111 4 0.52 0.936 0.895 0.838 0.615 0.621 0.861 0.578 0.549 0.846 0.764 0.693
20 7 1 4 140 4 0.635 0.889 0.959 0.732 0.717 0.902 0.51 0.928 0.904 0.887 0.924 0.643
21 11 4 12 57 4 0.535 0.992 0.982 0.688 0.871 0.514 0.898 0.555 0.584 0.963 0.648 0.959
22 15 2 9 56 5 0.568 0.934 0.912 0.883 0.559 0.871 0.521 0.975 0.992 0.742 0.637 0.709
23 12 5 7 105 3 0.742 0.891 0.863 0.844 0.869 0.609 0.947 0.586 0.678 0.648 0.992 0.551
24 7 3 5 70 4 0.537 0.908 0.828 0.738 0.693 0.742 0.752 0.867 0.871 0.627 0.84 0.5
25 8 4 12 182 1 0.693 0.768 0.998 0.535 0.744 0.811 0.916 0.646 0.527 0.705 0.883 0.883
26 15 2 14 116 2 0.521 0.842 0.943 0.879 0.951 0.607 0.627 0.742 0.98 0.65 0.756 0.758
27 4 6 7 166 2 0.721 0.803 0.904 0.859 0.621 0.836 0.775 0.645 0.729 0.777 0.711 0.564
28 7 1 4 154 2 0.684 0.848 0.771 0.736 0.902 0.762 0.711 0.783 0.902 0.99 0.621 0.652
29 8 6 13 57 1 0.703 0.918 0.887 0.744 0.988 0.875 0.887 0.615 0.689 0.924 0.902 0.768
30 6 2 8 37 1 0.58 0.875 0.787 0.949 0.604 0.578 0.715 0.898 0.869 0.82 0.693 0.945
31 15 6 3 106 2 0.559 0.836 0.955 0.855 0.832 0.844 0.797 0.705 0.529 0.561 0.592 0.576
32 4 3 4 66 1 0.699 0.77 0.967 0.605 0.736 0.711 0.57 0.818 0.949 0.609 0.533 0.713
33 14 5 13 116 3 1 0.551 0.854 0.666 0.699 0.57 0.514 0.791 0.713 0.57 0.59 0.594
34 11 3 11 143 4 0.986 0.734 0.789 0.953 0.791 0.807 0.982 0.582 0.875 0.689 0.613 0.527
35 8 6 5 129 4 0.971 0.594 0.785 0.789 0.658 0.605 0.588 0.908 0.545 0.775 0.922 0.996
36 6 2 7 145 4 0.939 0.627 0.984 0.715 0.799 0.926 0.975 0.607 0.795 0.771 0.873 0.994
37 10 4 8 50 5 0.877 0.604 0.916 0.709 0.865 0.523 0.654 0.973 0.727 0.734 0.529 0.598
38 12 2 10 65 4 0.867 0.547 0.791 0.787 0.588 0.984 0.924 0.617 0.922 0.781 0.574 0.621
39 10 4 6 79 4 0.883 0.74 0.846 0.877 0.77 0.564 0.656 0.896 0.662 0.596 0.93 0.842
40 14 2 5 103 4 0.85 0.629 0.857 0.734 0.652 0.877 0.932 0.748 0.867 0.557 0.982 0.891
41 6 5 15 135 2 0.869 0.607 0.855 0.582 0.6 0.85 0.676 0.813 0.676 0.553 0.818 0.682
42 7 1 13 173 2 0.783 0.695 0.809 0.988 0.855 0.748 0.822 0.611 0.844 0.584 0.855 0.52
43 5 7 3 177 2 0.988 0.748 0.973 0.955 0.641 0.828 0.594 0.848 0.709 0.9 0.656 0.867
44 1 1 3 160 2 0.885 0.666 0.813 0.629 0.961 0.709 0.988 0.762 0.988 0.896 0.768 0.846
45 7 6 10 23 1 0.822 0.602 0.754 0.598 0.977 0.854 0.523 0.916 0.518 0.857 0.734 0.502
46 5 2 13 44 1 0.994 0.6 0.951 0.9 0.564 0.535 0.836 0.625 0.74 0.949 0.805 0.676
47 5 4 2 59 2 0.881 0.736 0.795 0.93 0.92 0.73 0.563 0.873 0.734 0.523 0.604 0.967
48 11 1 3 53 2 0.969 0.639 0.773 0.604 0.619 0.631 0.941 0.76 0.816 0.521 0.549 0.811
49 3 5 10 153 5 0.68 0.686 0.762 0.504 0.689 0.537 0.936 0.859 0.553 0.633 0.539 0.939
50 8 0 15 122 5 0.574 0.641 0.961 0.801 0.826 1 0.643 0.672 0.746 0.504 0.523 0.908  
MIW LCS SUW LCS Red MB Mines Merchants LCS Pd MIW H Pd SUW H Pd NLOS Pk 57mm Pk 30mm Pk RAM Pk .50 Cal Pk Clearance Pk Hellfire Pk MIW USV Pd MIW RMV Pd
MIW LCS 1
SUW LCS -0.009548 1
Red MB -0.0092 0.013054 1
Mines 0.001471 -0.017017 0.001986 1
Merchants 0.012379 -0.008449 -0.0052 0.007248 1
LCS Pd -0.001289 -0.017743 -0.005651 0.000194 0.001769 1
MIW H Pd -0.000456 0.016523 -0.006656 -0.000604 0.020929 -2.88E-09 1
SUW H Pd 0.002217 0.007658 0.001522 -0.000351 0.019231 -2.88E-09 -2.88E-09 1
NLOS Pk 0.00119 0.008488 -0.005867 0.001453 0.000536 -0.002098 0.001248 0.000493 1
57mm Pk 0.000507 -0.010682 0.004147 3.6E-05 0.055852 -0.000697 -0.000687 5.743E-06 -0.003554 1
30mm Pk 0.003604 0.002544 -0.007679 -0.002384 -0.014816 0.000413 5.56E-06 -0.0021232 0.001026 -0.001356 1
RAM Pk 0.002456 0.007216 0.001233 0.00014 -0.013941 -0.00061 0.000852 -0.0008678 0.001876 8.17E-05 0.00032 1
.50 Cal Pk -0.00546 -0.000299 0.003291 -0.001784 0.027077 -0.001945 -0.001387 0.0007366 -6.62E-05 -0.001977 -0.000416 -0.002106 1
Clearance Pk -0.00953 0.008943 0.001245 0.002015 -0.010187 0.000623 0.000814 0.0010342 0.001039 -0.001011 0.000895 5.69E-05 0.000669 1
Hellfire Pk 0.004909 0.034771 -0.003316 4.22E-05 0.021787 0.000981 -4.15E-05 0.0010674 -9.3E-05 -0.001404 0.001877 2.17E-05 -0.00103 -0.001199022 1
MIW USV Pd -0.00532 0.000571 0.002182 -0.001384 0.012028 -0.000501 0.002151 -0.000777 0.000511 -0.002811 -0.000577 -3.21E-05 0.002938 -0.00184459 0.0010995 1




APPENDIX C. RUBY CODE FOR RUNNING EXPERIMENT 
Three different programs were written in order to run the simulation experiment.  
The first program used the input data from the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) to make 257 patches for the base warfare scenario.  The second program applied 
these patches to the base warfare scenario creating 257 XML files for the simulation to 
run.  The third program was used to run the simulation experiment, and label the output 
files appropriately 
A. CODE CREATING PATCHES 
 The code displayed was used for the SUW scenario.  Due to the differences 




    result=[] 
    elements=[] 
    counter = 0 
    fh=File.open("SUWInput.csv") 
    while line=fh.gets 
       counter= counter + 1 
       elements=line.strip.split(",") 
       orig=File.open(str) 
       result=orig.readlines 
       result[5]=result[5].sub("2", elements[0].to_s) 
       result[9]=result[9].sub("7000", (elements[11].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[13]=result[13].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[17]=result[17].sub("7000", (elements[12].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[21]=result[21].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[25]=result[25].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[29]=result[29].sub("7000", (elements[11].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[33]=result[33].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[37]=result[37].sub("7000", (elements[12].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[41]=result[41].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[45]=result[45].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[49]=result[49].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[53]=result[53].sub("7000", (elements[12].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[57]=result[57].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[61]=result[61].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[65]=result[65].sub("45", elements[2].to_s) 
       result[69]=result[69].sub("2", elements[0].to_s) 
       result[73]=result[73].sub("7000", (elements[10].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[77]=result[77].sub("6000", (elements[9].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[81]=result[81].sub("7000", (elements[10].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[85]=result[85].sub("6000", (elements[9].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
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       result[89]=result[89].sub("6000", (elements[9].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[118]=result[118].sub("6000", (elements[9].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[125]=result[125].sub("4", elements[4].to_s) 
       result[129]=result[129].sub("4", elements[4].to_s) 
       result[133]=result[133].sub("4", elements[4].to_s) 
       result[137]=result[137].sub("4", elements[3].to_s) 
       result[141]=result[141].sub("2", elements[1].to_s) 
       result[145]=result[145].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[149]=result[149].sub("7000", (elements[6].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[153]=result[153].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[157]=result[157].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[161]=result[161].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[165]=result[165].sub("7000", (elements[6].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[169]=result[169].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[173]=result[173].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[177]=result[177].sub("7000", (elements[5].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[181]=result[181].sub("7000", (elements[6].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[185]=result[185].sub("7000", (elements[7].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[189]=result[189].sub("7000", (elements[8].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[193]=result[193].sub("2", elements[1].to_s) 
       result[197]=result[197].sub("7000", (elements[14].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[201]=result[201].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[205]=result[205].sub("7000", (elements[14].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[209]=result[209].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[213]=result[213].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[217]=result[217].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[221]=result[221].sub("7000", (elements[14].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[225]=result[225].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[229]=result[229].sub("7000", (elements[14].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[233]=result[233].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[237]=result[237].sub("7000", (elements[14].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[241]=result[241].sub("6000", (elements[13].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[245]=result[245].sub("2", (elements[1].to_f * 2).to_i.to_s) 
       result[249]=result[249].sub("6000", (elements[15].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[257]=result[257].sub("6000", (elements[15].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       result[265]=result[265].sub("6000", (elements[15].to_f * 10000).to_i.to_s) 
       newName= "design" + counter.to_s + ".patch" 
       hope=File.new(newName, File::CREAT|File::TRUNC|File::RDWR, 0644) 
       for i in 0...270 
          hope.write(result[i]) 
       end   
   end   












B. CODE CONVERTING PATCHES TO XMLS 
This program converts the patches into the XMLs that will run the simulation.  
Since each scenario had to patch a different base file, this code was altered to reflect the 
scenario being worked on.  The code below was used for the MIW scenario: 
patch_toxml.rb 
 
suffix = ".patch" 
if ARGV.length > 0 
   prefix = ARGV.shift 
   suffix = ARGV.shift if ARGV.length > 0 
   Dir["*" + suffix].each do |fname| 
      if fname =~ /#{prefix}/ 
         bn = File.basename(fname, ".patch") 
         cmdLine = "patch " + "BaseMIW.xml " + fname + " -o " + bn + ".xml" 
         puts `#{cmdLine}` 
       end 
    end 
else 




C. CODE TO RUN XMLS 
 This program runs the 257 different XML files through MANA using the 
command line, and labels the output CSV file with the design number.  This code was 




if ARGV.length > 0 
   prefix = ARGV.shift 
   suffix = ARGV.shift if ARGV.length > 0 
   Dir["*" + suffix].each do |fname| 
      if fname =~ /#{prefix}/ 
         bn = File.basename(fname, ".xml") 
         cmdLine = "MANAC -f" + fname + " -m" + bn + ".csv" + " -n30"  
         puts `#{cmdLine}` 
      end 















































APPENDIX D. RUBY CODE FOR DATA PROCESSING 
Ruby programs were written in order to make the output files easy to manipulate 
for analysis.  The first program added the design number to the output file, while the 
second gleaned the necessary information and created one large output file for each 
scenario. 
A. CODE TO ADD DESIGN 
Since every run was replicated 30 times in each scenario, the same Ruby program 




if ARGV.length > 0 
   prefix = ARGV.shift 
   suffix = ARGV.shift if ARGV.length > 0 
   Dir["*" + suffix].each do |fname| 
      if fname =~ /#{prefix}/ 
         number = fname.chomp.sub(/#{prefix}/, "").sub(/_.*\./,    
                        ".").sub(/#{suffix}/,"") 
         results=[] 
         orig=File.open(fname) 
         results=orig.readlines 
         bn=File.basename(fname, ".csv") 
         newName=bn + "clean" + suffix 
         hope=File.new(newName, File::CREAT|File::TRUNC|File::RDWR, 0644) 
         results[5].insert(0, "Design,") 
         for i in 6...40 
            results[i].insert(0, number + ",") 
         end 
         for i in 0...40 
            hope.write(results[i]) 
         end 
      end 







B. CODE TO GLEAN AND COMBINE DATA 
The 257 output files needed to be combined into a single output file per scenario.  
This program was used to achieve that end, as well as to glean the necessary information 
from each individual output file.  Since each scenario had different names for the agents, 





   results=[] 
   header=["Design, Run, Seed, TotBlueCas, TotRedCas, BlueReachGoal,   
                  RedReachGoal, Steps, SUWLCSCas, MBCas, SUWHeloCas, OutboundCas,  
                  InboundCas, AnchoredCas, RedSubCas, ASWLCSCas, ASWHeloCas,  
                  ASWUSVCas, SUWLCSInj, MBInj, SUWHeloInj, OutboundInj, InboundInj,  
                  AnchoredInj, RedSubInj, ASWLCSInj, ASWHeloInj, ASWUSVInj\n"]  
   newName="SUW30RunResults.csv" 
   hope=File.new(newName, File::CREAT|File::TRUNC|File::RDWR, 0644) 
   hope.write(header) 
   suffix = ".csv" 
   if ARGV.length > 0 
      prefix = ARGV.shift 
      suffix = ARGV.shift if ARGV.length > 0 
      Dir["*" + suffix].each do |fname| 
         if fname =~ /#{prefix}/ 
           orig=File.open(fname) 
           results=orig.readlines 
           for i in 6...36 
              hope.write(results[i]) 
           end 
         end 
      end 
   end 
   puts "Data is cleaned.  Good luck with the analysis." 
end 
 
puts "Cleaning Data...please wait." 







APPENDIX E. GRAPHS, CHARTS, AND TREES 
This appendix provides the graphs, charts, and trees associated with analysis 
provided in Chapter IV. 
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Regression Analysis for 
Mean(Total Blue Casualties) 
and Mean (Total LCS 
Casualties)
•Identifies SUW LCS, ASW 
LCS, Missile Boats, 
Submarines, and NLOS Pk
as statistically significant
•These five parameters 
explain 82 per cent of 
the variation in Mean 
(Total Blue Casualties) 
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Mean of Response



































































































































Regression tree for Mean(Total Blue Casualties)
•Submarines play a significant role
•Suggested maximum of SUW LCS is 10 when there are less than 3 
submarines
•If greater than 3 submarines and less than 5 SUW LCS then approximately 2 
ASW LCS are necessary to reduce casualties
• 4 SUW LCS + 2 ASW LCS


















































































































































































































































































































Regression tree for Mean(Total LCS Casualties)
•Supports squadron size of 6 – 10 LCS
•Upper bound of 10 LCS due to SUW LCS split if less than 
3 submarines



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regression tree for Mean(Total Blue Casualties) with Total LCS
•First split supports upper bound of 10 for LCS squadron
•Split under less than 14 Total LCS supports 6 – 10 range for LCS 
squadron
•When less than 8 total LCS, there is potential for low mean 
casualties
•When greater than 8 total LCS, there is potential for lower 






















Regression tree for Mean(Total LCS Casualties) with Total LCS
•Initial split supports upper bound of 10 for LCS squadron


















































































































































































































































































































































1 to 2 ASW LCS decrease
mean casualties while producing 
high enemy casualties
5 or more SUW LCS produces

























Regression analysis of Mean(Total Red Casualties)
• Identifies SUW LCS, Missile Boats and 
Submarines as statistically significant
– These parameters explain 88 per cent of the variation 
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P<.0001 RSq=0.88 RMSE=4.5921
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Regression tree for Mean(Total Red Casualties) 
•In this case high means are good
•Split support the 6 – 10 range for LCS squadron, and suggests at 







































































































































































• Regression analysis of 
Mean(Total Blue Casualties)
– Identifies ASW LCS, 
Missile Boats, and 
Submarines as statistically 
significant
– These parameters explain 78 
per cent of the variance in 
mean(total Blue Casualties)
• Regression analysis of 
Mean(Total LCS Casualties)
– Identifies Missile Boats, 
Submarines, LCS Pd, SUW 
LCS, and ASW LCS as 
statistically significant
– These parameters explain 72 
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P<.0001 RSq=0.72 RMSE=1.5914
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• Mean(Total Blue Casualties) with Total LCS
– Significant factor is number of submarines
– Splits for both less than and greater than 16 submarines support a squadron size 
of 6 – 10 LCS



































































































































































• Mean(Total LCS Casualties) with Total LCS
– Significant factor is number of submarines
– Suggests that at certain levels either a saturation is needed (i.e. 24 LCS for less than 14 
submarines) or the threat is too large for LCS to handle (i.e. less than 8 LCS for more 
than 18 submarines

























































































































































































































• Mean(Total Red Casualties) 
– Identifies SUW LCS, ASW LCS, Missile Boats, 
Submarines, and Blue Torpedo Pk as statistically 
significant
– These parameters explain 88 per cent of the variance in 
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• Mean(Total Red Casualties) 
– High means are good
– Suggests that 7 ASW LCS provides more red casualties on average 
– Blue Torpedo Pk greater than 0.79 provide higher red casualties when there are 























• Mean(Total Blue Casualties) 
from Effects Screening
– 6 ≤ Total LCS ≤ 10 Data Set
– Looking at sensors and 
weapon systems only
– Identifies Hellfire Pk, RAM 
Pk, and SUW Helo Pd as 
statistically significant
– These parameters with the 
interaction term explain 51 per 
cent of the variance in mean 
total blue casualties in the data 
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• Mean(Total Red 
Casualties)
– 6 ≤ Total LCS ≤ 10 
Data Set
– Looking at sensors and 
weapon systems only
– Identifies USV Pd and 
an interaction term as 
statistically significant
– These two parameters 
explain 54 per cent of 
the variance in mean 
total red casualties for 
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• Mean(Total Blue 
Casualties)
– Identifies MIW LCS, 
SUW LCS, Missile 
Boats, Mines, and 
Clearance Pk as 
statistically significant
– These five parameters 
explain 78 per cent of the 
variance in mean total 
blue casualties
• Mean(Total LCS 
Casualties)
– Identifies MIW LCS, 
Missile Boats, Mines, 
and 57mm Pk as 
statistically significant
– These four parameters 
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• Mean(Total Blue Casualties)
– Missile Boats guarding the mines have a greater impact on blue 
casualties than the mines
– Suggests that approximately 6 MIW LCS help keep blue casualties low 
when there are up to 8 Missile Boats

































































































































































































































































































• Mean(Total LCS Casualties)
– Mines have greater impact on LCS casualties
– Minimum of 6 MIW LCS reduces LCS casualties when there are less 
than 182 mines
• When there are 6 or more MIW LCS at least 1 SUW LCS reduces LCS 
casualties
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(MIW RMV Pd-0.75001)*(NLOS Pk-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(MIW Helo Pd-0.75001)
(MIW Helo Pd-0.75001)*(MIW Helo Pd-0.75001)
(LCS Pd-0.75001)*(LCS Pd-0.75001)*(LCS Pd-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(Clearance Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(Clearance Pk-0.75001)*(Clearance Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(SUW Helo Pd-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(SUW Helo Pd-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(MIW RMV Pd-0.75001)
(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(MIW RMV Pd-0.75001)*(MIW RMV Pd-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(NLOS Pk-0.75001)
(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(NLOS Pk-0.75001)
(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(SUW Helo Pd-0.75001)*(NLOS Pk-0.75001)
(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)*(NLOS Pk-0.75001)
(Clearance Pk-0.75001)*(Clearance Pk-0.75001)*(MIW USV Pd-0.75001)*(SUW Helo Pd-0.75001)
(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(57mm Pk-0.75001)*(SUW Helo Pd-0.75001)*(Hellfire Pk-0.75001)



































































































• Mean(Total LCS 
Casualties) from 
Effects Screening
– Looking only at 
sensors and 
weapon systems











































































































































































































LIST OF REFERENCES 
Cioppa, Thomas M., Lucas, Thomas W., and Sanchez, Susan M., “Military Applications 
of Agent Based Simulations,” Proceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation 
Conference, 2004.  
 
Commander Naval Surface Forces, Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of 
Operations (Revision B), 02 January 2007. 
 
Dunnigan, James F., and Nofi, Albert A., “Victory at Sea,” William Morrow & 
Company, Inc.: 1995, p. 537-539. 
 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Initial Capabilities Document for Assured Access 
in the Littorals, ACAT: I, 16 January 2004. 
 
Morris, Michael S., “Sufficiency Analysis in Surface Combatant Force Structure 
Studies,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, vol. 21, num. 3 
 
Program Manager LCS Mission Modules, Report To Congress:  Littoral Combat Ship 
Mission Modules, February 2008. 
 
Naval Warfare Development Command, Littoral Combat Ship Warfighting Concept of 
Operations (Revision A), 14 March 2007. 
 
Jane’s Information Group Limited, Underwater Warfare Systems 2005 – 2006, Biddles 
Limited, King’s Lynn, United Kingdom, 2005. 
 
Jane’s Information Group Limited, All The World’s Aircraft 2005 – 2006, Thanet Press, 
United Kingdom, 2005. 
 
Jane’s Information Group Limited, Fighting Ships 2005 – 2006, Thanet Press, United 
Kingdom, 2005. 
 
Galligan, David P., Anderson, Mark A., and Lauren, Michael K., Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata Version 3.0 Users Manual, March 2004. 
 
McIntosh, Gregory, e-mail to Lloyd Brown, “Non-target Class,” personal 
correspondence, 20 January 2008. 
 
Bain, Matthew D., "Supporting a Marine Corps Distributed Operations Platoon: A 
Quantitative Analysis," M.S. in Operations Research, September 2005. 
 
 108 
Cioppa, Thomas M., "Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-filling Experimental 
Designs for High-dimensional Complex Models," Ph.D. in Operations Research, 
September 2002. 
 
Hughes, Wayne P., Jr. CAPT, USN (Ret.), “Fleet Tactics:  Theory and Practice,” U.S. 
Naval Institute, 1986, p. 163. 
 
Thomas, Dave, “Programming Ruby: The Pragmatic Programmers’ Guide,” The 
Pragmatic Programmers, LLC, 2005. 
 





























INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3.  CAPT Michael Good, USN 
LCS Mission Modules (PMS 420) 
Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 
 
4.  Eric Rosenlof 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
Laurel, Maryland 
 
5. CAPT Lewis Nygard, USN 
 COMLCSRON San Diego 
 San Diego, California 
 
6. CAPT Robert Stewart, USN 
COMDESRON 31 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 
 
7. CAPT Steve Kelly, USN 
 COMTHIRDFLT  N9 
 San Diego, California 
 
8. CAPT Robert Adrion, USN 
 Sea Strike (N81T) Branch Head 
Pentagon, Virginia 
 
9.  CAPT Rob Winsor, USN 
Sea Basing Pillar (N81M) Branch Head 
Pentagon, Virginia 
 
10. CDR Aasgeir Gangsaas, USN 
 Sea Shaping (N81G) Deputy Branch Head 
 Pentagon, Virgina 
 
11. Christina K. Juergens 
 Sea Strike (N81T) 
 Pentagon, Virginia 
 110 
12. CDR Keith Kowalski, USN 
 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation 
 Naval Forces Division 
 Pentagon, Virginia 
 
13. CDR Carl Meuser, USN 
 CNSF LCS Action Officer 
 San Diego, California 
 
14.  CDR Joseph Chiaravallotti, USN 
 OPNAV N86 
 Pentagon, Virginia 
 
15. Jeff Koleser 
Ship Concept Manager LCS 5 (NAVSEA 05D) 
Washington Navy Yard, D. C. 
 
16. Gary Schnurrpusch 
 Naval Surface Warfare Analysis Group (NSWAG) Leader 
 Systems Planning and Analysis, Incorportated 
 Alexandria, Virginia 
 
17. Craig Knouse 
 Undersea Warfare Acquisition Support Group (USAG) Leader 
 Systems Planning and Analysis, Incorporated 
 Alexandria, Virginia 
 
18.   Steven E. Anderson 
 Naval Surface Warfare Center – Dahlgren 
 Requirements Analysis and Advanced Concepts Division (W10) 
 Dahlgren, Virginia 
 
19.  CDR Chris DeGregory, USN 
COMDESRON 26 N01 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
20. LCDR Michael Vecerkauskas, USN 
 COMSURFWARDEVGRU 
 Little Creek, Virginia 
  
21. J. Patrick Madden 
 Sea Shield Integrator (N81P) 




22.  Dr. Thomas Lucas 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
23.  CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (Ret.) 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
24. CAPT Doug Otte, USN 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
